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INTRODUCTION
1

The public craze for corporate accountability has sparked a recent
debate over the state of nonprofit governance and charitable
2
3
accountability. Despite varying suggestions for reform, scholars
1. Public demand for corporate accountability reached its height after the
Enron scandal in 2001, which led to the creation of the largest federal corporate
reform in decades, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); see also Sherry Castle Whitley, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002: A Primer on Reformed Corporate Accountability, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP.
236 (2002) (outlining the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and describing the
legislature’s intent to curtail recent failures in corporate accountability).
2. The Chicago-Kent Law Review dedicated its 2005 symposium entirely to the
subject of nonprofit and charitable enforcement. The symposium papers are an
excellent background source on issues related to this Comment. See generally
Symposium, Who Guards the Guardians?: Monitoring and Enforcement of Charity
Governance, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 543 (2005) (providing an extensive overview of the
issues of nonprofit governance).
3. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 VILL. L.
REV. 433, 504 (1996) [hereinafter Brody, Institutional Dissonance] (urging increased
attorney general funding specifically for charity enforcement); Milton Cerny &
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4

agree that the current “sad state” of charitable enforcement is
5
6
inadequate and “more theoretical than real.” Accounts of university
presidents who receive excessive compensation, misappropriate
school funds for personal use, and questionably manage school assets
provide particularly disturbing examples of failed charitable
7
enforcement. In particular, recent allegations against Benjamin
Ladner, former president of American University, cast doubts on
8
whether universities are putting education first.
After serving as president of American University for eleven years,
Benjamin Ladner was dismissed in October 2005 after a months-long
investigation by university trustees into his spending of university
9
funds.
Anonymous tips and increased press attention spurred
trustees to review Ladner’s expenses, such as first class travel,
extravagant family meals, use of university staff for personal errands,
and lavish expenditures on liquor and entertainment—including
Catherine E. Livingston, IRS Intermediate Sanctions: How They Will Impact Colleges and
Universities, 25 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 865, 865-67 (1999) (discussing the possibility of IRS
enforcement through revocation of federal tax-exempt status and intermediate tax
penalties against abusive charities); Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of
Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L.
631, 637-38 (1997-98) (suggesting expanded use of private charitable enforcement);
Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State
Responsibility, 71 HARV. L. REV. 433, 476-83 (1960) (proposing the creation of state
nonprofit oversight agencies to regulate the use of charitable contributions and
investigate cases of nonprofit abuse); Dana Brakman Reiser, There Ought To Be a Law:
The Disclosure Focus of Recent Legislative Proposals for Nonprofit Reform, 80 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 559, 568-80 (2005) [hereinafter Reiser, There Ought to Be a Law] (highlighting
recent reforms in New York and Massachusetts which focus on increased disclosure
and nonprofit self-regulation). For a brief and thorough review of suggestions for
charitable enforcement reform, see MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 336-38
(Harvard Univ. Press 2004).
See also infra Part II.C (discussing charitable
enforcement reform in greater detail).
4. Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
497, 601 (1981) (hypothesizing that a relaxed social attitude towards nonprofits has
perpetuated lenient enforcement efforts by state authorities).
5. Karst, supra note 3, at 437 (describing attorney general charitable
enforcement as “irregular and infrequent”).
6. Iris J. Goodwin, Donor Standing To Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society vs. Donor
Empowerment, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1138 (2005); see also Paul G. Haskell, The
University as Trustee, 17 GA. L. REV. 1, 24 (1982) (“[N]o one now exercises general
oversight of the activities of private universities.”).
7. See Alec Macgillis, The Princely Habits of College Presidents, BALT. SUN, Oct. 2,
2005, at 1F (detailing four recent university presidential spending scandals, including
Benjamin Ladner of American University in 2005, Gregory O’Brien of the University
of New Orleans in 2003, Mark Perkins of Towson University in 2002, and Peter
Diamandopoulos of Adelphi University in 1997).
8. See Editorial, Fired in Style, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH (Va.), Nov. 30, 2005, at A10
(“Ladner fattened his lifestyle, and now his pockets, with money diverted directly
from the school’s academic programs.”).
9. See generally Jean Marie Angelo, Spending Debacle Undoes University President,
UNIV. BUS., Nov. 1, 2005.
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10

spending on an engagement party for his son.
All told, it is
suspected that Ladner misused more than $500,000 of the university’s
11
funds between 2002 and 2005.
The university community received another shock in November
2005, when the American University Board of Trustees agreed to
12
dismiss Ladner with a severance package valued at $3.7 million. In
addition to angering the university community and making
headlines, the Ladner scandal also made history. In December 2005,
for the first time on record, the U.S. Senate Finance Committee
launched an investigation into the governance and operations of a
13
private university.
Occurring less than ten years after a similar scandal at Adelphi
14
University, the Ladner scandal exposes a need for a critical
examination of the unique problems of fiduciary and charitable
15
enforcement in the private university setting. While scholars have
noted the lack of accountability in the nonprofit sector for nearly fifty
16
years, few have questioned whether the justification for attorney
10. Lois Romano, AU Scandal Atypical in Post-Enron Era, College Presidents Say,
WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2005, at A18; Macgillis, supra note 7.
11. Michael Janofsky, American U. Dismisses Its President Over Spending, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 11, 2005, at A14; Macgillis, supra note 7.
12. See Fired in Style, supra note 8 (scoffing at American University’s decision to
hand Ladner a “golden parachute,” and arguing that he should have been fired for
cause).
13. See Alan Finder, Senate Panel to Review American U. Board’s Actions on Spending,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2005, at A20 (discussing Senator Charles Grassley’s decision to
investigate whether the American University Board of Trustees acted properly in
handling the Ladner investigation and dismissal).
14. In the mid 1990s, Adelphi University President Peter Diamondopoulis and
eighteen Adelphi University trustees were removed from their positions amid
allegations of excessive compensation and waste of school assets. See Evelyn Brody,
The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 1401-02 (1998) [hereinafter
Brody, Limits of Fiduciary Law] (providing information and background on the
Adelphi University scandal); Bruce Lambert, New York Regents Oust 18 Trustees from
Adelphi U., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1997, at A1 (discussing Adelphi University’s attempts
to recruit new trustees in the wake of the scandal); see also MacGillis, supra note 7
(discussing four recent scandals by university presidents).
15. See Robert Steele Jr., Letter to the Editor, American University: College or
Corporation?, WASH. TIMES (Wash., D.C.), Oct. 16, 2005, at B02 (emphasizing how
modern university presidents resemble corporate executives, and urging universities
to examine the Ladner case to avoid creating similar “administrative monsters”).
16. Publication of The Charitable Dollar in 1960 sparked debate over nonprofit
accountability, the effectiveness of attorney general enforcement, the proper
regulation of nonprofit entities, and the costs and benefits of proposed reforms. See
generally Karst, supra note 3, at 435-68 (providing a broad overview of legal
mechanisms available to enforce charitable fiduciaries in the 1960s). Soon
thereafter, California and New York responded by enacting separate statutes to
govern nonprofit corporations, which served as templates for the American Law
Institute’s (“ALI”) Model and Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Acts. See
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (1987); MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (1964);
see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 5000 (West 2006) (creating provisions of law applicable to

2006]

THE CASE FOR A.U. (ACCOUNTABLE UNIVERSITIES)

133
17

general enforcement applies equally to private universities. Fewer
still have explored the historical treatment of student enforcement
attempts or critically examined students’ alternative enforcement
18
options.
Each year approximately 3.8 million students attend private
19
colleges in the United States and place $69 billion in the hands of
20
university trustees. These sizable figures, combined with ineffective
attorney general enforcement and recurring university scandals, hint
at a looming problem in higher education. At a minimum, they call
for a critical analysis of current university fiduciary enforcement by
the attorneys general and exploration of the alternative private
enforcement mechanisms available to students.
This Comment examines issues of charitable fiduciary enforcement
in the context of private universities. Part I reviews the law of
charitable entities, the rationale behind attorney general charitable
enforcement, and the failures of that enforcement regime. It also
examines generally the private charitable enforcement options of
special interest standing and nonprofit member derivative suits. Part
II examines these issues in the context of the private university, and
details why student attempts to enforce the fiduciary duties of
corporations formed for public or charitable purposes); FREMONT-SMITH, supra note
3, at 52 (relaying the origins of the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act in the
California act). Today, nearly all states have codified some version of the ALI’s Model
Acts, and a line of jurisprudence unique to nonprofit organizations has begun to
develop. See id. at 152 app. tbl.3 (cataloging each state’s nonprofit corporation law
and describing its relation to the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act).
17. See Karst, supra note 3, at 434 (stressing the need to conserve charitable funds
for public service purposes through efficient enforcement methods); see also infra
Part I.B (explaining that the benefits of exclusive attorney general enforcement
consistently outweigh the costs of enforcement alternatives for the nonprofit sector
generally by protecting charities from vexatious and frivolous private litigation with
uninterested parties).
18. The most comprehensive examination of the issue of standing in cases where
university students challenge administrator decisions and conduct considers only the
historical treatment of students under the special interest doctrine of charitable trust
enforcement. See Mary Grace Blasko, Curt S. Crossley & David Lloyd, Standing to Sue
in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 37, 64-65 & 72-74 (1993) (reviewing cases in
which students sought injunctive relief or damages from school administrators).
19. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION
STATISTICS, ch. 3 (2004), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d04/tables/dt04_33
8.asp (last visited July 27, 2006) [hereinafter EDUCATION STATISTICS].
20. This figure is the average annual tuition paid per private university student
(approximately $18,000) multiplied by the number of students enrolled each year in
private universities (approximately 3.85 million), which totals approximately $69.3
billion in annual private university tuition paid. See id. (listing enrollment figures);
John Boehner, House Education & Workforce Committee, Fact Sheet: The Skyrocketing
Cost of Higher Education, 2003 HOUSE EDUC. & WORKFORCE COMMITTEE, at 1, available at
http://edworkforce.house.gov/issues/108th/education/highereducation/factsheetc
ost101003.htm [hereinafter Skyrocketing Cost of Higher Education] (providing tuition
statistics).
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university administrators under the special interest doctrine have
failed. Part III argues for the judicial recognition of a university
student derivative cause of action under the precedent of Stern v. Lucy
Webb Hayes National Training School. Because university students are
analogous to nonprofit corporation members and allow them to
bring derivative suits to enforce the fiduciary duties that university
presidents and trustees owe to the school.
I.

THE FORM AND ENFORCEMENT OF CHARITABLE ENTITIES

The concept of a university student derivative suit is, at first glance,
deceptively simple. Students, as the primary beneficiaries of private
university services, are the most logical and natural constituency for
holding university leaders accountable.
However, the law of
charitable institutions, which is derived from both trust and
corporate principles, greatly complicates the ability of students to
bring these enforcement actions. Therefore, a brief primer on
charitable institutions and enforcement is in order.
A. The Legal Forms of Charitable Entities: Charitable Trusts and Nonprofit
Corporations
In the United States, two forms of legal entity are available for
accomplishing charitable work—the charitable trust and the
21
nonprofit corporation.
1. Charitable trust
The charitable trust is the original charitable form in the United
22
23
States. Like a private trust, a charitable trust divides the rights to
manage and use trust property between the charitable trustee and a
24
By separating these rights, private and
charitable beneficiary.
21. See Evelyn Brody, Charity Governance: What’s Trust Law Got to Do with It?, 80
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 641, 646 (2005) [hereinafter Brody, Charity Governance] (discussing
the legal consequences of choosing a nonprofit corporation and a charitable trust).
22. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 43-48 (explaining that early American
colonists adopted the legal form of the charitable trust and its corresponding
common law because it was the preferred form for charities in England at the time).
23. In a private trust, the trustee retains legal title and control of the trust
property while the beneficiary retains the right to use and enjoy that property. Brody,
Limits of Fiduciary Law, supra note 14, at 1419. Since the beneficiary bears the
economic risk of property ownership, he retains an automatic legal right to oversee
trustees’ property management and enforce trustee fiduciary duties in courts of law.
See id. at 1420 (describing the trustee’s duty of loyalty and discussing potential legal
consequences for a breach in this duty).
24. The power to manage, control, and make decisions regarding charitable trust
property is placed in the hands of a charitable trustee. See id. at 1421 (discussing the
strict fiduciary standard applied to charitable trustees). A charitable beneficiary is a
member of the class of persons intended by the grantor to receive the benefits, use,
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charitable trusts create incentives for trustees to prioritize their own
25
To combat this agency
interests over those of the beneficiary.
26
problem, the law imposes the strictest duties of loyalty, care, fair
27
dealing, and obedience on trustees as they manage trust property.
The charitable trust differs from the private trust because it gives
28
rise to a different form of beneficial interest. A charitable trust
benefits a recognized cause or purpose instead of an individually
29
named beneficiary. Because charitable trusts benefit social purposes
or meet needs that are otherwise public responsibility, they save
30
society the cost of that charitable function.
Consequently, the
31
general public is the “true” beneficiary of the charitable trust. The
and enjoyment of the property. See Robert A. Katz, Let Charitable Directors Direct: Why
Trust Law Should Not Curb Board Discretion Over a Charitable Corporation’s Mission and
Unrestricted Assets, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689, 709 (2005) (explaining that a charitable
trust’s ultimate beneficiaries are “the public or the community at large”).
25. Neither private nor charitable trustees bear the economic risk of property
devaluation; therefore, they are more willing to take unreasonable investment risks
or engage in self-dealing transactions to maximize their personal gain from the
relationship. See id. at 710 (“[A] charitable trust’s trustees may be tempted to diverge
from the settlor’s instructions in order to generate what they believe is a greater
benefit for the beneficiaries (i.e., the public) or to advance their own idiosyncratic
objectives.”).
26. See id. at 705-06 (explaining that the “usual agency problem” created by a
separation of management and risk results in a conflict between the trustee’s selfinterest and the interests of the beneficiaries).
27. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 92 (1991) (“Socially optimal fiduciary rules . . . preserve the gains
resulting from the separation of management from risk bearing while limiting the
ability of managers to give priority to their own interests over those of investors.”).
28. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 127-28 (distinguishing private and
charitable trusts by the recipient of the benefit provided); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 (1959) (eliminating any reference to a beneficiary from
the definition of a charitable trust, and requiring only the existence of a fiduciary
charged with using the property for a specific charitable purpose).
29. See Brody, Limits of Fiduciary Law, supra note 14, at 1421 (contrasting private
trusts, which name specific beneficiaries, with charitable trusts, which create
indefinite beneficiaries); Katz, supra note 24, at 709 (“Whereas a private trust must
benefit identified or identifiable individuals . . . a charitable trust can confer benefits
directly upon members of an indefinite class of persons . . . .”); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 (explaining that a charitable trust subjects “the person by
whom the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for a
charitable purpose”). For example, where a private trust would name the grantor’s
elderly spouse as the beneficiary, a charitable trust would dedicate property to the
purpose of supporting elderly widows. See Hooker v. Edes Home, 579 A.2d 608 (D.C.
1990) (holding that a donation made to create and maintain a home for elderly, lowincome Georgetown widows created a charitable trust).
30. Charities fill a quasi-governmental role by providing services for which the
government would otherwise be responsible. Blasko ET AL., supra note 18, at 37.
Thus, the state has an interest in promoting efficiency in the charitable sector to
further charitable goals and meet public needs. See Karst, supra note 3, at 437-38
(discussing the public sector’s “paramount interest” in the disposition of money
designated for private charity).
31. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 127 (explaining how the indefinite
beneficiary requirement for charitable trusts places the true benefit of the charity in
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individual recipients of charitable aid are secondary beneficiaries who
32
enjoy only an indefinite or indirect legal interest in the charity.
2. Nonprofit corporation
The nonprofit corporation is the most common and popular
33
charitable form in America and borrows key characteristics from
34
For instance, like charitable
both trust and corporate entities.
trusts, nonprofit corporations typically serve eleemosynary, or
35
charitable, purposes. Thus, the principles of charitable trust law
36
often apply to cases involving nonprofit corporations. Like business
corporations, nonprofit corporations are formed under state
37
incorporation laws, have organizational structures similar to for38
profit corporations, and share property ownership rights and
39
perpetual existence separate from their managers and members.
the public sector).
32. See id. at 128 (describing secondary charitable trusts’ beneficiaries, those who
actually receive aid, as mere “‘conduits of the social benefits to the public’” (quoting
GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 362 (3d
ed. 1977))).
33. See generally James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and
an Agenda For Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 629-37 (1985) (tracing the development of
the nonprofit corporation in the United States, and explaining the American
preference for the corporate form as a reaction to the success, ease of formation, and
acceptance of the business corporation by American society and government).
34. See infra notes 36-51 and accompanying text (discussing the basic principles
of nonprofit corporation law).
35. For example, both the United Way of America and the American Red Cross
are organized as nonprofit corporations to accomplish community development and
disaster relief, which are traditionally recognized charitable purposes. See American
Red Cross, http://www.redcross.org/aboutus (last visited July 16, 2006)
(emphasizing its commitment to domestic and international relief and
development); United Way, http://national.unitedway.org/ourwork/index.cfm (last
visited July 16, 2006) (highlighting its work in community and economic
development).
36. See Brody, Charity Governance, supra note 21, at 648 (discussing the general
convergence of corporate and trust doctrines in the law of charities, but noting
several important distinctions such as fiduciary standards and use of restricted
donations).
37. In a minority of states (Delaware and Kansas), nonprofit organizations
incorporate under the same enabling statute as business corporations, but include
restrictive charitable purpose and profit-seeking clauses in the charity’s articles of
incorporation. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 152. In the majority of states, which
recognize important distinctions between for-profit and nonprofit entities, separate
nonprofit corporation codes exist for nonprofit incorporation. See id. at 152, app.
tbl.3 (discussing the available modes of incorporation among the states and listing
the applicable incorporation statutes for each state). These nonprofit corporation
codes are often modeled after the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act of 1987
(“RMNCA”). Id.
38. Both for-profit and nonprofit corporations use the split-control governance
structure, which consists of a board of directors that broadly governs the mission and
direction of the organization, as well as officers and managers who oversee daily
operations. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 8.01(a), 8.40(a) (1987)
(requiring each nonprofit corporation to have a board of directors and providing
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Nonprofit corporations differ from their business counterparts in
two key respects. First, nonprofit corporations can exist with or
40
Second, although nonprofit
without shareholders or members.
corporations are allowed to collect profits from sales of merchandise
or services, they are strictly prohibited from making distributions of
41
those profits to their members.
Those nonprofit corporations that do recognize members
generally organize for the common benefit of their members, or
provide members with products or services otherwise unavailable in
42
the market.
Common examples include social clubs, political
43
interest groups, consumer federations, and trade associations.
These members share some similar rights and privileges as corporate
shareholders. Nonprofit members may exercise some control of the
44
45
organization through voting or derivative litigation. Membership

default offices of president, secretary, and treasurer).
39. See, e.g., Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518,
636 (1819) (explaining how incorporation enables groups of individuals to
accomplish common goals through one entity that can “manage its own affairs,
and . . . hold property, without the perplexing intricacies . . . of perpetual
conveyances”).
40. The RMNCA gives nonprofit corporations the option of creating classes of
members in the organization. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.01(a)
(“[A nonprofit corporation] may establish criteria . . . for the admission of
members.”) (emphasis added). These individuals resemble shareholders because
they have voting rights, often make donations or pay membership fees, and have the
right to bring derivative actions on behalf of the corporation. Id. §§ 1.40(21), 6.30.
41. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 13.01, 13.02 (prohibiting public
benefit and religious corporations from distributing monetary earnings to members,
but allowing these corporations to earn sufficient profits to support their continued
operation); James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218,
225-26 (2003) (discussing how the nondistribution constraint of a nonprofit
corporation distinguishes it from a business corporation).
42. See Avner Ben-Ner, Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector? Reforming Law and
Public Policy Towards Nonprofit Organizations, 104 YALE L.J. 731, 733-34 (1994)
(explaining that a large percentage of nonprofit corporations exist to meet the needs
of its members where the market has failed to do so); cf. Hansmann, supra note 4, at
502-04 (discussing the reasons why nonprofit incorporators choose the member or
nonmember structure, focusing particularly on the goals of the organization and
whether the primary focus of the nonprofit corporation is to benefit the general
public or the members themselves).
43. See Hansmann, supra note 4, at 502-03 (listing examples of different types of
donative, commercial, mutual and entrepreneurial nonprofits).
44. Voting rights normally entitle members to a voice in the amendment of the
articles of incorporation and the right to elect directors. See REVISED MODEL
NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 1.40(21), 6.01 (defining “members” as those who have the
right to vote for directors of the organization, but granting nonprofit incorporators
great flexibility in structuring and defining member classes).
45. See id. § 6.30 (establishing the statutory right of members to bring derivative
suits in place of the nonprofit corporation when certain conditions have been met);
see also Bourne v. Williams, 633 S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981)
(recognizing the common law right of nonprofit members to bring derivative suits).
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dues often serve as the corporation’s main source of income, but
47
Most importantly,
dues are not a prerequisite to membership.
members participate, are committed to, and are continually
interested in the goals, purposes, and operations of the
48
organization.
Nonmember nonprofits do not recognize a voting member class,
but leave organizational control entirely in the hands of a self49
perpetuating board of directors.
Nonmember nonprofits usually
provide services for a broad or loosely defined class of beneficiaries,
and therefore are more likely to rely on donations or product sales
50
for operating income. Examples of nonmember nonprofits include
prototypical charities like the United Way, the Red Cross, and public
51
service providers such as hospitals.
B. Charitable Enforcement Under the Attorney General
Despite the distinctions between charitable trusts and nonprofit
52
corporations, enforcement of their missions and fiduciary duties is
46. Nonprofit membership dues may be analogous in some situations to the
purchase price of corporate shares. In both cases, shareholders or nonprofit
members give something of value (money, time, or commitment) in exchange for
privileges associated with the organization (for shareholders, the privilege of sharing
profits, and for members, the privileges of membership and involvement). Cf.
Brenda Boykin, The Nonprofit Corporation in North Carolina: Recognizing a Right to
Member Derivative Suits, 63 N.C. L. REV. 999, 1012 (1985) (explaining that while a
member of a nonprofit corporation does not have an equity interest, he or she may
have a pecuniary interest because membership is generally contingent on the
payment of dues).
47. Compare REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.02 (“Except as provided in
its articles or bylaws, a corporation may admit members for no consideration or for
such consideration as is determined by the board.”), with REVISED MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT § 6.21(b) (2002) (“The board of directors may authorize shares to be
issued for consideration consisting of any tangible or intangible property or benefit
to the corporation, including cash, promissory notes, services performed, contracts
for services to be performed, or other securities . . . .”).
48. See Lizabeth A. Moody, The Who, What, and How of the Revised Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act, 16 N. KY. L. REV. 251, 270-71 (1989) (emphasizing that the
membership provisions under the RMNCA were designed to reflect members’
governing and functional—not financial—roles in the organization).
49. See Hansmann, supra note 4, at 502 (explaining that if an organization does
not have members, then an autonomous board is vested with the responsibility of
electing a director and voting on other fundamental issues).
50. See id. (distinguishing between donative nonprofits, which rely on
unrestricted donations for income, and commercial nonprofits, which obtain most of
their income from prices charged for goods and services).
51. Id. at 502-03.
52. See Brody, Charity Governance, supra note 21, at 648 (highlighting two
substantive legal differences between the trust and corporate charitable forms:
applicable fiduciary standards and powers of trustees and directors). Generally
speaking, charitable trustees are held to stricter fiduciary standards of loyalty and
care than nonprofit directors. Id.; see also Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training
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53

accomplished in the same manner. Since the general public is the
54
primary beneficiary of both charitable forms, enforcement authority
rests primarily with the attorney general as representative of the
55
public interest. Individual members of the public generally do not
have standing to enforce charitable purposes or fiduciary duties, or to
56
challenge the management of charitable assets.
Several policy considerations support the system of attorney
general enforcement. In practical terms, it is difficult to identify
Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries (Stern II), 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (applying corporate standards of management, not trust standards, when
judging the validity of nonprofit directors’ actions). Nonprofit directors also
generally have greater decision-making flexibility in administrative matters,
amendment of the corporate articles, and merger or dissolution decisions. See
FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 155-58 (discussing the flexible means of nonprofit
management, amendment, and asset reallocation under the RMNCA and other state
nonprofit corporation codes). Meanwhile, courts retain a quasi-supervisory role over
trust management under the doctrines of cy pres and deviation, which limit the power
of charitable trustees to dissolve or reallocate trust assets to new or expanded
purposes. Id. at 173-86; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348, cmt. f (1959)
(discussing charitable directors’ elevated control in using donations due to the lack
of the cy pres doctrine in charitable corporate law).
53. The rules governing the enforcement of charitable trusts apply equally to
charitable corporations. See, e.g., Holt v. Coll. Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons,
394 P.2d 932, 937 (Cal. 1964) (applying the law of charitable trust enforcement to
allow the “trustees” of a charitable corporation to bring suit); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 348, cmt. f (“Ordinarily the principles and rules applicable to charitable
trusts are applicable to charitable corporations.”). The rationale behind this rule is
clear: incorporation offers charities a number of advantages including limited
liability and flexibility in governance and decision-making. See supra note 52 and
accompanying text (outlining the advantages and flexibility under the nonprofit
corporate form). If courts applied vastly different legal standards to similar
charitable entities, an incentive would exist for trustees to incorporate in order to
circumvent donors’ intentions in managing trust property. Applying different
standards and creating opportunities for disregard of donor intent would thwart the
policy goal of encouraging philanthropy. Therefore, the trust laws governing
charitable enforcement must be applied to all organizations receiving donations,
regardless of their form of governance.
54. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (explaining why the general
public is the primary beneficiary of work done for charitable purposes).
55. In most states, the power of the attorney general has been enacted by statute.
See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 1.70 (1987) (empowering the
attorney general to institute or intervene in any action involving a nonprofit
corporation). In the few states where the legislature has remained silent on the issue
of charitable enforcement, the courts have derived the attorney general’s
enforcement power from its executive parens patriae role in society. See FREMONTSMITH, supra note 3, at 301, 305-06.
56. Most private parties are barred by restrictive standing rules from filing
enforcement suits against charities. See Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp Found., 479
N.E.2d 752, 755 (N.Y. 1985) (finding that the “general rule” of charitable
enforcement under New York law excluded charitable beneficiaries from bring suit
against a charity); see also FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 324 (explaining that the
common law largely excluded members of the general public from enforcing
charitable funds). However, some exceptions to the rule of attorney general
enforcement have been made under the special interest doctrine. See infra Part
II.D.1 (discussing the rationale and application of the special interest doctrine).
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those charitable beneficiaries who merit standing and to assure
58
consistent application of legal standards to all charities. In addition,
private enforcers may not have the personal interest or financial
resources to guarantee proper and complete charitable
59
enforcement.
Most importantly, attorney general enforcement
60
protects charities from vexatious litigation, thereby fostering more
61
efficient use of charitable funds. Ultimately, without a centralized
system of enforcement through the attorney general, charities would
devote more of their resources to legal matters and ultimately deplete
62
the amount of money available for charity work in society. Despite
these justifications for attorney general enforcement, as the next
Section discusses, this enforcement regime is not a perfect system.
57. Given the large and indefinite nature of the charitable beneficiary class, it is
difficult to identify those individuals who have a legally protected interest in the
charity. See Karst, supra note 3, at 436-37 (noting that in a charitable organization
there is no beneficiary comparable to a private trust holder or a shareholder in a
business corporation). The highly individualized and factual inquiry necessary to
determine standing in these cases would require additional judicial line-drawing,
could create more confusion and, ultimately, higher operational costs for charities.
Id.
58. In theory, centralized supervision through the attorney general ensures that
enforcement of charitable trusts and nonprofit corporations is systematic and
consistent among the different charities within each state.
59. Private enforcement can lead to conflicting legal rules and disparate
application of laws and case outcomes, all of which deflect charitable funds away
from their intended purposes and negate the social benefit of a functional charity
sector. See Blasko ET AL., supra note 18, at 39 (warning that increased charitable
enforcement would lead to a “loss of confidence in private charities’ administration,
either by individual donors to charitable corporations or by those planning to
establish charitable trusts”).
60. Vexatious litigation arises in two contexts. First, it occurs when those
individuals with an insignificant, outside, or passing interest in a charity are
permitted to challenge a charity’s action. Cf. id. at 82 (explaining that most
charitable entities lack a formally recognized membership). Second, vexatious
litigation can arise simply where a large number of potential beneficiaries exists. See
Haskell, supra note 6, at 25 (raising concerns about the “prospect of vexatious
litigation if standing were to be broadened substantially”). The general public, the
charitable beneficiary, is largely undefined and encompasses a countless number of
individuals. See Katz, supra note 24, at 709 (describing charitable beneficiaries as the
public and the community “at large”). If each member of the public were a
beneficiary with standing to enforce a charity, the amount of potential private
litigation would be overwhelming. See Blasko ET AL., supra note 18, at 39 (discussing
the high social costs that an expansion of charitable enforcement would impose,
“especially in opening charities to potentially vexatious litigation”).
61. Limiting private party enforcement ultimately frees donated funds for use in
education, poverty alleviation, healthcare, or some other socially valuable cause.
Barring private parties from challenging charitable administration is practical
because it saves charities money in the form of litigation costs, potential liability, and
reduced operating costs. See Karst, supra note 3, at 449 (“Members of the public at
large cannot sue to enforce the duties of a charitable fiduciary, because if the rule
were otherwise ‘it would be possible to subject the charity to harassing litigation.’”
(quoting 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 391 (1956))).
62. Id.
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C. Failures of Attorney General Enforcement and Alternative Enforcement
Mechanisms
1. Attorney General failures
Although it is difficult to accurately measure the amount of
63
wrongdoing in the nonprofit sector, recurring nonprofit scandals
suggest that attorney general enforcement is not effectively
64
addressing the problem.
It is widely agreed that state attorneys
general have failed to adequately prevent, detect, and prosecute
65
misconduct or fiduciary breaches in the nonprofit setting.
Many factors contribute to the failure of the attorneys general.
Primarily, this failure stems from a lack of funding specifically for
66
attorney general charitable enforcement.
As a result, attorneys
67
general are understaffed, deficient in time and resources, and ill68
equipped to litigate breaches of charitable fiduciary duties. The
69
unavailability of reliable charity financial information and the other
responsibilities of the attorney general also limit charitable
70
enforcement. Additionally, the political self-interest of the attorney
63. See Marion R. Fremont-Smith & Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoing by Officers and
Directors of Charities:
A Survey of Press Reports 1995-2002, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=451240 (last visited July 18, 2006) (prefacing their study, which compiled
and classified news reports of nonprofit scandals, with the caveat that the actual
extent of wrongdoing in the nonprofit sector is difficult to estimate).
64. See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text (discussing recent scandals
involving questionable compensation and spending by university presidents
Benjamin Ladner and Peter Diamondopoulos).
65. See, e.g., Fishman, supra note 41, at 268 (“[S]tate attorney general offices have
neither the person-power, nor sometimes the will, to monitor nonprofits
effectively.”).
66. See, e.g., David Villar Patton, The Queen, the Attorney General, and the Modern
Charitable Fiduciary: A Historical Perspective on Charitable Enforcement Reform, 11 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 164-65 (2000) (“[C]ritiques can largely be boiled-down to the
assertion that . . . [the] state attorney general suffers from a lack of funds. . . .”).
67. Understaffing of charitable enforcement divisions prevents the proper and
thorough investigation of allegations of wrongdoing, and severely hinders effective
prosecution of those legitimate charges that are uncovered. See Blasko ET AL., supra
note 18, at 48 (discussing the epidemic understaffing of charitable enforcement
actions in attorney general offices nationwide, and noting that less than one-fifth of
the offices assigned full-time attorneys to charitable enforcement cases and slightly
more than one-fifth assigned no attorneys at all).
68. See Patton, supra note 66, at 164-65 (asserting that state attorneys general face
extremely heavy caseloads).
69. See Karst, supra note 3, at 451-55 (discussing the lack of, and need for,
detailed financial reporting requirements to improve the effectiveness of charitable
enforcement by the attorneys general). Without the statutory power to continually
access financial information through a disclosure system, attorneys general are
reliant on nonprofit whistleblowers and suspecting citizens for tips on fiduciary
breaches. Id. at 452-53. Once investigations are actually pursued, the lack of reliable
information further delays and limits attorney general effectiveness. Id. at 455.
70. See Blasko ET AL., supra note 18, at 38-39 (commenting that the existence of
other attorney general duties contributes to selective prosecution of only the worst
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general may influence or impede the oversight of charitable
71
accountability among prominent members of the community.
2. Enforcement alternatives
In light of these problems, scholars offer several different reform
models to enhance the effectiveness of attorney general
72
The first and most basic is a call for increased
enforcement.
73
attorney general funding. Increased funding directly alleviates the
74
obvious problems of lack of time, staff, and investigatory resources.
More money leads to more staff and attorneys, better investigation of
allegations of charity misdeeds, and more time spent actually
litigating legitimate cases. Yet, the realities of politics, history, and
75
funding priorities make this change unlikely or inadequate. Despite

cases of charitable abuse). Attorneys general are not exclusively committed to
charitable enforcement and must prioritize other important duties such as crime
prevention. Id. The multi-faceted public role of the attorney general lowers the
effectiveness of attempted accountability, as it diverts time and resources away from
charitable enforcement. Id.
71. See Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism And Paternalism In State Charity
Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 947-48 (2004) [hereinafter Brody, Whose Public?]
(noting also that some charitable enforcement cases may be irresistible to incumbent
attorneys general). In most states, where the attorney general is elected, he or she is
dependent on campaign contributions and popularity amongst the people. Id. at
948 & n.40. Often, charitable directors accused of misconduct are the prominent
business professionals or political actors who contribute financially or politically to
the reelection of the attorney general. See id. at 948 & n.41 (asserting that the
pressures on attorneys general are similar to those on any other politician). The
attorney general’s self-interest in protecting these prominent individuals from public
scandal may serve as an important underlying factor in the decision not to prosecute
or investigate allegations of wrongdoing. Id.
72. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 336-37 (cataloging the various scholarly
calls for enforcement reform in the nonprofit sector).
73. See Karst, supra note 3, at 451-52. Some commentators also suggest that along
with increased funding, states should expand the attorney general’s statutory power
to gather financial information from charities. See id. (suggesting that states follow
New Hampshire’s lead by implementing mandatory reporting systems); see also
Reiser, There Ought to Be a Law, supra note 3, at 611-12 (arguing that recent reforms
instituting stricter charitable disclosure will be effective only if attorneys general are
simultaneously given more resources to utilize the newly collected data).
74. See Karst, supra note 3, at 451-53. However, increased funding for attorney
general enforcement fails to address the problem of attorney general political selfinterest. See, e.g., Brody, Whose Public?, supra note 71, at 947-48 (noting that most
attorneys general are elected officials subject of political pressure). Increased
funding does not solve, nor even consider, this essentially human problem of selfinterest and favoritism, and therefore cannot be the panacea for current
enforcement failures.
75. See Brody, Whose Public?, supra note 71, at 947-48 (discussing the pressures on
politically accountable attorneys general). See Blasko ET AL., supra note 18, at 48
(noting, even after decades of public debate over charitable enforcement, that less
than one-fifth of attorney general offices assigned full-time attorneys to charitable
enforcement cases and slightly more than one-fifth assigned no attorneys at all).
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over fifty years of critical calls for charity reform, legislators continue
76
to prioritize other spending initiatives over charitable enforcement.
Others propose the creation of state charity oversight boards to
77
monitor, investigate, advise, and litigate against charities.
These
reforms are based on the theory that full disclosure and access to
78
charity financial information will spur greater accountability.
However, in this age of deregulation, neither legislators nor the
79
public are likely to embrace new bureaucracies. Creating charity
oversight boards requires significant state government restructuring
at a substantial public cost, and increases the cost of continual
80
disclosure for charities. These expenses, the public hesitation to
increase government regulation, and the historically low priority of
funding charitable accountability make this reform doubtful.
81
Increased IRS oversight is another common suggestion. Both the
76. In the forty years since Karst’s publication of The Efficiency of the Charitable
Dollar, nearly all commentators have suggested the need for additional funding of
attorneys general as a necessary component of improved accountability. See supra
note 3 and accompanying text (discussing various approaches to increase nonprofit
accountability). However, despite congressional consideration of the problem on
many occasions, as well as nonprofit corporation law reforms, funding for charitable
enforcement programs has not changed significantly. See Reiser, There Ought to Be a
Law, supra note 3, at 566-68 (classifying legislative action on nonprofit reform as still
in the early stages); see also Blasko ET AL., supra note 18, at 48 (describing the lack of
attorney general staffing).
77. See Karst, supra note 3, at 476-82 (urging the creation of state charity
oversight boards); see also FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 375 (discussing the
general disinterest with which states have viewed scholarly suggestions of charity
oversight boards).
78. See Reiser, There Ought to Be a Law, supra note 3, at 562-68 (discussing the
recent state and federal legislative focus on disclosure-based reform).
79. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 375 (considering the inherent difficulties
of implementing suggested oversight agency reforms). In light of the current
inability to accurately estimate the extent of nonprofit malfeasance and fraud, an
expensive system of oversight may be an over-reaction to inflated fears of nonprofit
directors’ misbehavior. See Fremont-Smith & Kosaras, supra note 63, at 2 (stating that
the irregular policing of nonprofits and the private nature of many settlement
agreements inhibits the ability to estimate the scope of nonprofit malfeasance).
80. The additional costs of mandatory financial disclosure, similar to that
required of public corporations by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
contradict the underlying policy goal of freeing charitable funds for more efficient
use in charitable purposes. See Karyn R. Vanderwarren, Financial Accountability In
Charitable Organizations: Mandating An Audit Committee Function, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
963, 964 (2002) (“[P]roposed reforms must address the need for public
accountability without interfering with the independence that charities require to
carry out their missions.”).
81. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 377-78 (explaining that federal charity
oversight has developed primarily through the tax code, not other federal regulatory
agencies like the Justice Department, mainly due to “historical accident”). Recently,
the U.S. Congress enacted intermediate sanctions that provide the IRS with further
tools to monitor charitable activity. See generally Cerny & Livingston, supra note 3
(outlining in detail the 1998 IRS intermediate sanctions, which impose tax penalties
against abuse of charitable funds for personal benefit, and discussing their impact on
such college and university financial decisions as presidential compensation).
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82

overlap between tax-exempt and nonprofit organizations and the
83
IRS’s extensive knowledge of charities support this alternative.
However, IRS oversight is unlikely to fix charitable enforcement
problems because matters of tax status and organizational structure
84
are distinct and do not lend themselves to shared enforcement. The
IRS may have more access to information, but it has no mechanism
85
or authority to enforce charitable fiduciary responsibilities.
In
addition, IRS enforcement presents the same problem of resource
reallocation as reforms calling for increased funding of state
86
attorneys general.
87
Increased private enforcement—through derivative suits, realtor
88
actions, and liberalized standing rules—is the most feasible and
82. “Tax-exempt status” refers to exemption from federal income taxes offered
to those organizations that qualify under section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue
Code. See also FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 58 (explaining the tax exemption
provisions available under the different subsections of section 501(c) and the types
of organizations falling into each category).
83. See Cerny & Livingston, supra note 3, at 965-67 (examining the IRS’ role in
oversight of nonprofit corporations and its resulting wealth of information in
charities).
84. Tax-exempt status only addresses an organization’s relationship with the
federal government for tax purposes, whereas state incorporation law governs
nonprofit structure and operation. See Brody, Institutional Dissonance, supra note 3, at
435-36 (dispelling the common public “conflation” between nonprofit corporations
and tax-exempt organizations, and defending states’ independent need to monitor
nonprofit organizations despite their tax status). Increased use of the IRS will reach
only those charitable organizations that depend on 501(c) exempt status, and will
not necessarily be able to police non-exempt charities. Id.
85. See Hansmann, supra note 4, at 602-04 (concluding that the IRS does not have
any direct interest in proper nonprofit fiduciary behavior, and therefore, is not the
appropriate vehicle for supplemental enforcement). Charitable and nonprofit
fiduciary standards exist under state law, not federal tax codes. The IRS has no
established mechanism to interpret or enforce fiduciary duties in state courts and
also lacks the jurisdiction to promulgate its own corporate fiduciary standards. Id.
Charitable oversight requires the IRS to act beyond the scope of its mission, and
would further complicate the federal tax system. Id.; see also Karst, supra note 3, at
443 (stating that expanded enforcement by the IRS is an indirect, and therefore less
efficient, method of increasing charitable fiduciary standards; policing fiduciary
breaches is also beyond the scope of the IRS’s mission of collecting tax revenue and
preventing abuse of charities for personal gain and tax avoidance).
86. Mobilizing the IRS would require the federal government to provide more
funding for additional staff, investigatory time, and resources, which is unlikely given
the congressional history of de-prioritizing nonprofit accountability issues. Cf.
Hansmann, supra note 4, at 604 (hypothesizing that burdening the IRS with the duty
to police transactions for honesty and fair dealing at current funding levels would
dilute its mission, which is the collection of government revenue).
87. E.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.30 (1987) (establishing the
right of members to bring derivative actions).
88. Realtor actions are a blended form of private and attorney general
enforcement. Here, private parties are “allowed to proceed in the name of the
people or the attorney general,” but carry the costs of litigation themselves. Blasko
ET AL., supra note 18, at 49-50. According to Blasko, realtor actions are an attractive,
but ultimately ineffective supplement to attorney general enforcement.
Id.
Although they enhance charity enforcement at no real additional cost to the state,
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preferred enforcement alternative for a number of reasons.
Primarily, private enforcement increases accountability without
substantially or directly raising public costs, since private parties bear
90
the costs of litigating cases.
In addition, increased exposure to
private litigation promotes accountability as it encourages charity
directors to observe their fiduciary obligations more closely to avoid
91
litigation altogether. Private enforcement also solves the political
self-interest problem by removing the attorney general from the
92
Both corporate and trust law recognize the
decision to litigate.
93
utility of private actions through shareholder derivative suits and the
94
common law doctrine of special interest standing, which are
discussed in greater detail in the following Section.
the fact that the attorney general retains ultimate control over the case and may
“withdraw, dismiss, or compromise it at any time” seriously undermines the force of
private litigation incentives. Id. at 49.
89. See Goldschmid, supra note 3, at 652-53 (arguing for expanded use of private
party enforcement through derivative and realtor actions because private
enforcement is the most cost-effective method of increasing charitable
accountability); see also Patton, supra note 66, at 176 (“[R]eform predicated on
increased standing is particularly compelling . . . [because it] accomplishes a number
of laudable policy goals such as (1) recognizing the reality that other parties, apart
from the state attorney general, have a legitimate stake in charities, (2) bolstering
overall enforcement, and (3) avoiding the pitfalls of over-regulation, such as
vexatious and wasteful litigation.”).
90. See Blasko ET AL., supra note 18, at 53-59 (comparing nonprofit derivative suits
to those brought by corporate shareholders). Private enforcement allows individual
parties with legally recognized interests in the charity to invest their own time,
money, and labor in investigating and litigating charges of maladministration. Id.
The private enforcement regime capitalizes on the natural, individual self-interest
arising in economic agency relationships to monitor fiduciary actions and promote
accountability. Id. Nonprofit members, donors, consumers, and beneficiaries
already have incentives to monitor and prosecute breaches of fiduciary duty.
Allowing private enforcement therefore, saves the government from manufacturing
this incentive through a state function, which costs the government and the public
less. See Goldschmid, supra note 3, at 652 (suggesting realtor actions to supplement
improved governmental enforcement).
91. See id. at 652-53 (advocating expanded use of derivative litigation by donors,
members, and beneficiaries to make charitable enforcement more effective because
“less restrictive standing rules . . . provide significant self-protective incentives for
more active nonprofit governance and could create the deterrence necessary to
make substantive fiduciary standards effective”).
92. In derivative suits and actions under the special interest doctrine, the
attorney general’s office does not have the same preemptive powers of withdrawal
and dismissal that it enjoys in realtor actions. Cf. Blasko ET AL., supra note 18, at 4950 (explaining the extensive involvement of the attorney general in any realtor
action and discussing why this control severely undercuts quasi-private enforcement
alternatives).
93. See id. at 53 (explaining that shareholder derivative suits serve as a central
mechanism for enforcing fiduciary duties of corporate directors and managers,
efficiently ensuring the proper alignment of shareholder and management
interests).
94. See id. at 49-50, 59-61 (discussing derivative suits in the corporate context and
the origins and purposes behind the special interest doctrine in the context of
charitable trusts); see also infra Part I.D.1 (noting that some courts have extended the

146

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1

D. Mechanisms for Private Charitable Enforcement
Two forms of private charitable enforcement exist. Under trust
law, the special interest doctrine allows individual charitable
beneficiaries to enforce charitable duties if they hold an interest in
95
the charity sufficiently distinct from the public interest.
Under
corporate principles similar to those of the shareholder derivative
suit, member derivative suits allow recognized nonprofit members to
96
enforce the fiduciary duties of nonprofit directors.
1. The special interest doctrine
The special interest doctrine developed from the common law of
trusts to supplement attorney general enforcement through limited
97
private party litigation.
Under the doctrine, if charitable
beneficiaries can demonstrate a “special” interest in the charity—one
that is sufficiently distinct from the public interest—they can proceed
98
with an enforcement action without involving the attorney general.
Although based in charitable trust law, courts have also applied the
special interest doctrine to cases involving charitable nonprofit
99
corporations. Scholars view the special interest doctrine as a well100
reasoned and important component of charity enforcement and
101
urge its expanded use to increase charitable accountability.
special interest doctrine to allow suits against nonprofit corporations).
95. See Blasko ET AL., supra note 18, at 59-78 (discussing the special interest
doctrine, its component factual considerations, and the application of this doctrine
in certain cases); see also infra Part I.D.1 (noting that the special interest doctrine
developed from the common law of trusts to supplement attorney general
enforcement).
96. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.30 (1987) (setting forth
parameters for member derivative suits); see also FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 33436 (discussing the statutory provisions enabling member derivative suits under the
RMNCA, California Nonprofit Code and New York Nonprofit Corporate Code); infra
Part I.D.2 (discussing member derivative suits further).
97. See Blasko ET AL., supra note 18, at 39-40, 54-55 (emphasizing that, while the
general public is the primary beneficiary of charity work, certain individuals may
have a greater interest in a specific charity than the public, and that the attorney
general is, at times incapable, unaware, or uninterested in representing these distinct
and legitimate interests).
98. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 328. (explaining that the special interest
doctrine operates as an exception to the general rule of exclusive attorney general
standing, and institutes a limited opportunity for private parties to enforce charitable
purposes)..
99. See, e.g., Lopez v. Medford Cmty. Ctr., Inc., 424 N.E.2d 229, 233 (Mass. 1981)
(granting special interest standing against a charitable corporation). See generally
Blasko ET AL., supra note 18, at 52 (“[T]he ‘special interest’ doctrine has been used
by some courts to expand standing to sue both charitable trusts and [nonprofit]
corporations.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959) (stating that private
parties with special interests have standing to enforce a charitable trust).
100. See Patton, supra note 66, at 170 (characterizing the special interest doctrine
as “a sound basis in which to grant standing to legitimately interested beneficiaries
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Whether a court grants special interest standing depends on the
exclusivity of the attorney general’s enforcement power and on the
102
Mary Grace Blasko
factual circumstances of the individual case.
and her associates have identified five factors that courts use to
determine whether a plaintiff holds a sufficiently special interest to
qualify for the standing under the doctrine. These factors are:
(a) the extraordinary nature of the acts complained of and the
remedy sought by the plaintiff; (b) the presence of fraud or
misconduct on the part of the charity or its directors; (c) the state
attorney general’s availability or effectiveness; . . . (d) the nature of
the benefited class and its relationship to the charity; . . . [and
103
(e) the] subjective and case-specific factual circumstances.

This list is not a defined test, but a compilation of the many facts
that courts have explicitly or implicitly considered in their decisions
104
Courts may use one, all, or a
on special interest standing.
combination of these factors to justify a decision to withhold or allow
105
private parties to proceed with charity enforcement actions.
2. The nonprofit member derivative suit
The second private enforcement mechanism, the nonprofit
106
In
member derivative suit, arose by analogy to the corporate law.
and to deny standing to those who would merely bring nuisance suits against
fiduciaries”).
101. See Goldschmid, supra note 3, at 652-53 (claiming that expanded private party
enforcement through derivative and realtor actions is the most cost-effective method
of increasing charitable accountability). However, a realtor, a private party “allowed
to proceed in the name of the people or the attorney general,” is an attractive, but
somewhat ineffective supplement to attorney general enforcement. Blasko ET AL.,
supra note 18, at 49-50. Although private parties take the lead and carry the costs of
prosecuting cases against suspected charity abuses, the attorney general retains
ultimate control over the case, so that the inherent problems of political self-interest
in attorney general enforcement remain. Id.
102. In the majority of states, the attorney general’s enforcement power is not
exclusive. See, e.g., Holt v. Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932,
934-35 (Cal. 1964) (noting that the majority position is that persons with special
interests may bring enforcement actions); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 391 (listing those parties qualified to enforce a charitable trust, including the
“Attorney General or other public officer, . . . a co-trustee, or . . . a person who has a
special interest in the enforcement of the charitable trust”). However, in some
states, state law provides that the attorney general is the sole charitable enforcer. See,
e.g., Miller v. Alderhold, 184 S.E.2d 172, 177 (Ga. 1971) (Grice, J., concurring)
(denying standing to students on the grounds that the Georgia statute gives the
attorney general “sole and exclusive power and duty” to enforce charitable trust
administration).
103. Blasko ET AL., supra note 18, at 61.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Corporate shareholders have long enjoyed the right to institute derivative
suits on behalf of the corporation. E.g., Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331, 335 (1855)
(recognizing shareholder derivative rights for the first time in American
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107

most states, which generally follow the approach of California and
108
the RMNCA, nonprofit members have a statutory right to pursue
109
derivative actions on behalf of the corporation. Like shareholders,
members may use the derivative action to enforce the legal claims of
the nonprofit corporation, including the guarantees of director
110
fiduciary duties.
The derivative action is available as a method of private charitable
111
enforcement only to nonprofit members.
Therefore, an
appreciation of the flexibility of membership structure offered by the
jurisprudence). In a derivative action, the shareholder seeks to vindicate rights
belonging to the corporation itself, not any direct right belonging to the individual
shareholder. Id. Therefore, shareholder plaintiffs do not recover individual
damages, but return any damages recovered to the corporation. See generally Susanna
M. Kim, Conflicting Ideologies of Group Litigation: Who May Challenge Settlements in Class
Actions and Derivative Suits?, 66 TENN. L. REV. 81, 99-106 (1998) (discussing the
historical background, development, and purposes of shareholder derivative suits).
The closely identical structures of nonprofit and business corporations put nonprofit
members and shareholders in similar relationships to their respective corporations.
See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 334-35 (explaining how the positions of
nonprofit members and shareholders give rise to “the same rights and liabilities”). By
analogy therefore, nonprofit members also should enjoy the long-standing right of
shareholders to enforce corporate rights through derivative suits. Id.
107. Even where state corporation laws do not expressly provide for nonprofit
member derivate suits, courts have recognized such derivative rights by analogy to
the corporate shareholder context. E.g., Bourne v. Williams, 633 S.W.2d 469, 471-72
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (recognizing common law rights of nonprofit members to
bring derivative actions); see Boykin, supra note 46, at 1007-08 (detailing the judicial
creation of member derivative rights in states where nonprofit corporation law was
silent on the issue, or spoke only of shareholders’ derivative rights).
108. See Moody, supra note 48, at 266 (“[T]he [RMNCA] adopts the California
approach in that it accept[s] the classifications used by California to wit: public
benefit, mutual benefit, and religious corporations. It also incorporates much of the
regulatory aspects of the California statute with respect to the powers of enforcement
entrusted to the Attorney General.”).
109. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.30 (1987) (establishing rights to
a member derivative suit under the Model Act); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW
§ 623(a) (McKinney 1985) (creating a nonprofit member derivative action designed
to mirror the New York business corporation law); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5710, 7710
(West 1985) (allowing nonprofit member derivative suits in California for two of the
three types of nonprofit organizations in the state); see also Boykin, supra note 46, at
1005-07 (discussing the development of member derivative suits under these state
laws).
110. See Boykin, supra note 46, at 1004 (describing shareholder derivative suits as a
useful method for enforcing officer and director fiduciary duties in the business
corporation); see also Note, When Should Courts Allow the Settlement of Duty-of-Loyalty
Derivative Suits?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1084, 1085 (1996) (noting that derivative suits are
necessary in the corporate context because ownership is separated from
management). See generally Leslie Larkin Cooney, A Modality for Accountability to
Shareholders: The American Way?, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 717, 718-24 (2003)
(explaining the procedure, uses, and history of shareholder derivative suits in
America).
111. See, e.g., O’Donnell v. Sardegna, 646 A.2d 398, 410 (Md. 1994) (denying
derivative claims of health insurance subscribers against a non-stock, nonprofit
insurance provider because they did not meet the requirements for technical
membership under Maryland corporation law).
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112

RMNCA is pivotal to determining whether member derivative suits
113
As a result of this freedom, some nonprofit
are possible.
corporations operate completely free from the accountability
114
demands that a membership or shareholder class creates.
The RMNCA sets two requirements for membership, and
consequently, derivative litigation rights. Members must enjoy
substantial voting rights within the nonprofit and these rights must be
115
expressly granted in the articles of incorporation. More noteworthy
is what the RMNCA does not require for nonprofit membership—
116
actual ownership. Since valuable consideration is not required for
membership status, member derivative rights cannot be explained by
any actual proprietary interest or equity ownership of the nonprofit
117
corporation.
Thus it appears that the rationale for membership
derivative suits is attributable instead to members’ control of and
118
The RMNCA recognizes that
commitment to the organization.
voting rights represent the personal, continuing interest and
112. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.01(a) (allowing for the
possibility of nonprofit corporations with no members at all).
113. See Robin Dimieri & Stephen Weiner, The Public Interest and Governing Boards
of Nonprofit Health Care Institutions, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1029, 1037 (1981) (discussing
situations wherein membership is coterminous with the board of directors, which
effectively insulates the board from any independent criticism). If a nonprofit
corporation incorporates without creating a membership class in its articles of
incorporation, it will not generally be subject to enforcement suits by anyone other
than the attorney general. Id. This flexibility under the RMNCA combined with the
ineffective level of attorney general enforcement makes self-governing nonprofit
directors, in reality, accountable to no one.
114. See id. (noting that insufficiently monitored nonprofit boards create a danger
that the board will be captured by management); Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering
Civil Society: The Social Cost Of Internally Undemocratic Nonprofits, 82 OR. L. REV. 829,
830 (2003) [hereinafter Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society] (discussing the incentives
for nonprofits to choose the non-membership form available under the RMNCA
membership governance structure).
115. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 1.40(21) (defining a member,
without regard to what a person is called in the articles of incorporation, on the basis
of the right to vote for the election of a director); see also Moody, supra note 48, at
270-71 (discussing the changed definition of member under the RMNCA, which
incorporated a voting requirement).
116. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.02 (allowing members to be
admitted for no consideration whatsoever); see also Moody, supra note 48, at 271
(associating membership rights with participation, not equity or financial
ownership).
117. See Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of
Charitable Fiduciaries?, 23 J. CORP. L. 655, 671 (1998) (distinguishing shareholders’
actual proprietary basis for derivative suits from that of members’ derivative rights);
Moody, supra note 48, at 270-71 (characterizing members’ relationship to the
nonprofit as one primarily of “participation rather than . . . financial interest
generated by an investment”).
118. See Moody, supra note 48, at 271 (correlating membership more closely to an
individual’s function within the organization). Cf. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP.
ACT § 1.40 (listing control through voting as the defining characteristic of nonprofit
membership).
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commitment that members have to the goals, operation, and mission
119
The member derivative suit therefore implicitly
of the nonprofit.
acknowledges that individuals who seek some control of the
organization hold an interest in charitable enforcement that is
distinct from the public interest and is privately enforceable.
II. CHARITABLE FORM AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE PRIVATE UNIVERSITY
CONTEXT
A. Private Universities As Nonmember Nonprofit Corporations
120

Private universities serve the charitable purpose of education and
121
may organize either as charitable trusts or nonprofit corporations.
122
Due to their size and complexity, the flexibility of the corporate
123
form,
and the overall trend in the nonprofit sector to “go
124
corporate,” nearly all private colleges today operate as nonprofit
125
corporations.
119. See Moody, supra note 48, at 273 (noting that the member-nonprofit
relationship is more personal in nature when compared to the purely profit-driven
shareholder-corporation relationship).
120. See Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 562-63
(1819) (describing private universities as eleemosynary institutions which serve the
long-recognized charitable purpose of education). Societies throughout time have
recognized education as one of the original charitable purposes. See FREMONT-SMITH,
supra note 3, at 3 (listing educational associations as charities in times as early as
Ptolemy, Plato, and ancient Rome). The recognition of education as a charitable
purpose continues today in America. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (recognizing education
as an approved federal tax-exempt charitable purpose).
121. See supra notes 28-32, 35 and accompanying text (defining both forms as
serving a charitable purpose).
122. See Robert E. McCormick & Roger E. Meiners, University Governance: A
Property Rights Perspective, 31 J.L. & ECON. 423, 424 (1988) (summarizing the
development of the complex, multi-tiered administrative structure of modern
colleges, including faculty members, departments, deans, presidents, and boards of
trustees).
123. See Algo D. Henderson, Control in Higher Education: Trends and Issues, 40 J.
HIGHER ED. 1, 3 (1969) (noting the many advantages of the corporate form for
universities).
The corporate form offers more flexibility for universities in
organizational structure and applicable legal standards. Id. Nonprofit university
incorporators have the option to include members in their organizational structure,
establish those members’ rights and privileges, and determine the number and roles
of directors or trustees. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 6.03, 6.10, 8.03.
Greater corporate flexibility also exists in the lower corporate fiduciary standards of
care and loyalty that govern the behavior of nonprofit directors and executives. See
Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F.
Supp. 1003, 1014-15 (D.D.C. 1974) (applying corporate, not trust fiduciary standards,
to the actions of nonprofit hospital directors and administrators); FREMONT-SMITH,
supra note 3, at 52-53 (explaining the more lenient application of corporate fiduciary
standards that apply to charitable directors).
124. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 49-50 (detailing the popularity of the
corporate charitable form in America).
125. See John A. Beach, The Management And Governance Of Academic Institutions, 12
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The governance structure of a private university mirrors that of a
business corporation. Boards of trustees, like corporate boards of
directors, broadly govern the university’s mission and oversee the
126
performance of university administrators and faculty.
University
presidents, like executive officers, manage the ongoing operations of
127
the school, implement the goals and policies set by trustees, and
128
answer ultimately to them.
Since private universities generally do
not recognize members in their corporate charters, “shareholders”
do not exist in the university setting and therefore university boards
129
of trustees are typically self-perpetuating.
However, where the
selection of new trustees or presidents includes alumni or faculty
approval, the university begins to resemble a mutual or member130
governed nonprofit corporation.

J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 301, 309 (1985) (highlighting the long tradition of colleges and
universities organizing as corporations).
126. See Emil A. Ricci, College And University Governance In The United States: An
Historical Survey (1999) (unpublished paper), http://home.comcast.net/~erozycki/
HEGovernance.html (last visited July 27, 2006) (asserting that trustees are ultimately
responsible for university governance). See generally John E. Corbally, Jr., Boards of
Trustees in the Governance of Higher Education, 9 THEORY INTO PRACTICE 239 (1970)
(summarizing critically the role, responsibilities, and actual practices of university
boards of trustees).
127. See John J. Corson, The Modernization of the University: The Impact of Function on
Governance, 42 J. HIGHER ED. 430, 436 (1971) (describing the changing role of
university presidents away from academic leader and toward administrative and
financial director).
128. See id. (asserting that many trustees have abdicated their traditional
responsibilities to governing officials such as presidents and deans).
129. See LOMBARDI ET AL., THE LOMBARDI PROGRAM ON MEASURING UNIVERSITY
PERFORMANCE, UNIVERSITY ORGANIZATION, GOVERNANCE, AND COMPETITIVENESS 6
(2002), available at http://thecenter.ufl.edu/UniversityOrganization.pdf (explaining
that in the typical self-perpetuating board, the university president and current
trustees nominate, select, and approve new trustees; students, alumni, and faculty
have little or no formal power in selecting members of the governing board).
130. According to Hansmann, the nature of the services that colleges provide and
their complicated governance characteristics defy, or at least complicate, the
classification of universities under his model. Hansmann, supra note 4, at 503-04.
He comments,
[u]niversities, for example, often combine elements of all four types [of
nonprofit organizations under this model]: . . . they typically have both
donative and commercial aspects; moreover, their boards of trustees are
often elected in part by the alumni (who comprise the bulk of the former
customers and current donors), and in part are self-perpetuating, so that they
are neither clearly mutual nor clearly entrepreneurial.
Id. (emphasis added).
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B. Enforcement of University Administrator Fiduciary Duties and University
Mission
131

As a nonmember nonprofit corporation,
enforcement of a
school’s charitable mission and trustee and administrator fiduciary
132
133
Regulation of
duties lies primarily with state attorneys general.
fiduciary duties in the university setting “do[es] not present unique
134
problems,”
and so the enforcement failures and alternatives
135
Given the
discussed above apply equally in the university context.
136
cost of private university tuition and the importance of college
education, this ineffective enforcement of university management
and administrator fiduciary duties does not inspire student
confidence in private education. This begs the question: what
alternatives are available for students to protect their educational
investment?
C. Private Enforcement of University Fiduciary Duties
In theory, university students may gain standing to challenge
university administrative action under one or both of the private
137
enforcement alternatives discussed above.
Students can either
establish a distinct interest in the university under the special interest
doctrine or qualify for nonprofit member derivative rights under
138
state nonprofit law. For a majority of charitable beneficiaries, these
two private enforcement vehicles work well to protect their charitable
interests, striking the right balance between preventing frivolous
139
litigation and supplementing charitable enforcement.
Students,
however, have not shared in the same success.
131. See supra Part II.A (explaining the university’s status as a nonprofit
corporation without members).
132. University administrators owe the classic corporate fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty to the university itself. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)
(1987) (establishing the nonprofit director’s duty to carry out all activities in good
faith, with “ordinarily prudent” care, and in the best interests of the corporation).
133. See, e.g., Miller v. Alderhold, 184 S.E.2d 172, 177 (Ga. 1971) (Grice, J.,
concurring) (denying university students standing to challenge financial decisions of
college trustees, stating that the attorney general has the exclusive power to enforce
the charitable purposes and proper administration of charities under Georgia law);
see also supra Part I.B (discussing the rationale for exclusive or primary attorney
general enforcement in the charitable sector).
134. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 10.
135. See supra Part I.C (discussing the enforcement failures of the attorney general
and supplemental enforcement options).
136. The average cost of private college tuition is approximately $18,000 per year.
The Skyrocketing Cost of Higher Education, supra note 20, at 2.
137. See supra Part I.D (outlining the two primary private charitable enforcement
doctrines: the special interest doctrine and the nonprofit member derivative suit).
138. Id.
139. In the prototypical charitable trust, the special interest doctrine allows
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1. Students do not qualify for private party standing under the special interest
doctrine
It is extremely rare that courts will find an adequate basis for
140
university student standing under the special interest doctrine. In
approximately 180 years, students have successfully gained standing
141
in only one case, and courts do not appear to be retreating from
this stance.
The denial of student special interest standing originates from the
1819 United States Supreme Court opinion in Trustees of Dartmouth
142
College v. Woodward.
There, trustees of Dartmouth College
challenged a state-mandated change to their corporate structure and
143
the conversion of the college into a university.
While recognizing
144
the important aggregate interests of the Dartmouth students, Chief
Justice Marshall declared that “[t]he students are fluctuating, and no
individual among our youth has a vested interest in the institution,
145
which can be asserted in a court of justice.” Instead, the Court left
representation and protection of the students’ interests with the

beneficiaries whose interest is distinct from and more direct than the general public
interest to enforce the charitable purpose or act. See, e.g., Hooker v. Edes Home, 579
A.2d 608 (D.C. 1990) (allowing widows to enforce a charitable trust originally
dedicated to establishing a home for elderly widows). Likewise, in a membership
nonprofit corporation, the statutory and common law member derivative suit has
recognized the nature of members’ rights in the nonprofit corporation and allowed
the appropriate level of legal relief. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.30
(1987) (recognizing a member derivative suit).
140. See, e.g., Miller v. Alderhold, 184 S.E.2d 172, 175 (Ga. 1971) (denying
students standing because they held no vested interest in the university); Assoc.
Students of Univ. of Or. v. Or. Inv. Council, 728 P.2d 30, 31-33 (Ct. App. Or. 1986)
(denying standing to students challenging university investment decisions because
they were a fluctuating class which could identify no interest distinct from the
interest of the general population); Blasko ET AL., supra note 18, at 64 (“[In most
cases courts deny standing to university students primarily because of the amorphous
and fluctuating nature of the class of students.”).
141. In Jones v. Grant, the Alabama Supreme Court found that “the interest of the
students . . . as beneficiaries in the financing of the educational institution with
which they are associated is a sufficient special interest to entitle them to bring suit.”
344 So.2d 1210, 1212 (Ala. 1977). In this case, students, faculty, and alumni of
Daniel Payne College brought an action against university trustees and
administrators for alleged self-dealing, embezzlement, and misuse of university
funds. Id. at 1210. This case has been distinguished from the long line of contrary
university student cases by the extraordinarily egregious and bad-faith nature of the
complained-of acts and the noticeable lack of enforcement or oversight by the
attorney general. See Blasko ET AL., supra note 18, at 64-65 (stating that allegations of
fraud strengthened the case for a grant of standing); Jones, 344 So.2d at 1212
(pointing to the patent diversion of funds in granting special interest standing).
142. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
143. Id. at 552-53.
144. See id. at 642-43 (“[The students’] potential rights . . . amount collectively to a
most important interest.”).
145. Id. at 641.
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146

college’s trustees.
Thus began the 180-year trend of denying
university students standing in charitable enforcement cases.
In interpreting this sentence from Dartmouth College, courts have
identified two obstacles to university student standing under the
147
special interest doctrine.
First is the large, fluctuating, and
148
amorphous nature of the class of university students. Second is the
lack of any direct, measurable student injury resulting from the
149
alleged university administrator misdeeds.
Courts cite these two
barriers to special interest standing so consistently that the denial of
150
standing for the class of university students is nearly “categorical.”
a. The nature of the student class
The denial of student standing based on the nature of the class as
large, fluctuating, and amorphous is fueled in part by practical
151
necessity. University students number into the millions, and at any
one time, a large percentage are graduating or matriculating in and
152
Most courts fear that expanded
out of the student population.
special interest standing will bring increased vexatious litigation
against the university by allowing any tuition-paying, enrolled student
with no campus experience and little financial investment to
153
challenge university action.
The case of Miller v. Alderhold typifies the judicial attitude toward
154
There, Atlanta Baptist University
the nature of the student class.
students alleged that the university trustees had breached their
fiduciary duties by selling school lands and continuing to employ a
155
president who “destroyed the academic integrity of the [c]ollege.”

146. Id. at 642-43.
147. Blasko ET AL., supra note 18, at 72.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 10 (estimating that twenty percent of all
college students nationwide attend private school).
152. Students are a fluctuating class because at any one time, a large section of the
student population is new to the school or preparing to leave it. Entering students
are unacquainted with university policies and administration, making them less
informed, less qualified, and less likely to bring action against the school.
Graduating students, who are better-acquainted with administrative operations, soon
will lose the legal rights of current students.
153. Blasko ET AL., supra note 18, at 41-42; see, e.g., Miller v. Alderhold, 184 S.E.2d
172, 175 (Ga. 1971); Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 403 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Tex.
1966) (noting that allowing litigation by private litigants who lack enough special
interest in the university would subject charities and their trustees to “undue
harassment”).
154. Miller, 184 S.E.2d at 175.
155. Id. at 173.
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Citing Dartmouth College, the Georgia Supreme Court found that the
156
students had no vested interest in the school. The court opined,
It is inconceivable that one 18-year-old boy or girl the day after his
or her admission to a private college could go into court or
through the State’s Attorneys, and seek to enjoin the trustees in the
management and operation of the college . . . solely because he or
157
she was a student.

b. Students’ lack of injury
Assuming a breach of fiduciary duty has occurred, the student must
still establish an actual injury resulting from this breach to gain
158
Courts often deny standing to students
special interest standing.
because they are unable to demonstrate a direct injury arising from
159
administrator malfeasance.
Students face several problems in
defining a direct injury from university administrative action. The
individual financial loss resulting from the fiduciary breach is difficult
160
to identify because it is derivative in nature and negligible in
161
Also, any identified loss is inextricably tied to other
amount.
university administrative choices and funds, making the specific cause
162
of that injury difficult to determine. Most courts have also rejected
student injuries arising from the lost “reputation value” of their
163
Courts view reputation
degrees or association with the university.
156. Id. at 174-75.
157. Id. at 175.
158. Cf. In re Barnes Found., 684 A.2d 123, 129-30 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (denying
standing to art students who challenged the application of art museum trust funds to
new purposes because students failed to show they would actually suffer any harm
from the new undertaking).
159. Blasko ET AL., supra note 18, at 72.
160. The university itself bears the initial financial loss arising from the
mismanagement of university assets. Therefore, the school itself holds a legal claim
for recovery of those losses. Any injury that students claim as a result of the loss in
school reputation is derivative, secondary, and speculative.
Cf. Trustees of
Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 641 (1819) (stating that
students had no direct vested interest in the school).
161. One student’s pro rata financial loss is theoretically equal to the percentage
of university income that his or her tuition and fees represent. This amount is very
small, and in most cases, is not worth the cost of litigating the matter.
162. Tuition payments and unrestricted charitable donations are used similarly by
universities and other nonprofit corporations to finance general operations. Tuition
funds are combined with other unrestricted donations and used in whatever way
administrators deem most appropriate. Therefore, definitively tracing specific
expenditures back to their origin as tuition is difficult. See Goodwin, supra note 6, at
1106 (“[G]ifts to charity are not restricted. . . . These gifts—with no conditions
attached—go toward the general operating expenses of the charity to be used as
those in charge see fit . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28, cmt. a (2003)
(noting that general charitable donations may be used to fund the charity’s general
operations).
163. See, e.g., Steeneck v. Univ. of Bridgeport, No. 93-0133773, 1994 WL 463629, at
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loss as an indirect and attenuated consequence of alleged
164
misconduct, and its effect is uncertain and difficult to measure.
Despite the very real effect that a university’s loss of reputation has on
students, courts have not signaled any intent to begin recognizing
165
and remedying these damages.
Moreover, even if students can
show an identifiable and measurable injury, courts find that the
student interest in enforcing charitable fiduciary duties is not
sufficiently distinct from the public interest to merit special interest
166
standing.
2. Students do not qualify for private party enforcement through the member
derivative suit
Under the majority view, students are most likely unqualified to
institute member derivative suits because they are not legally
167
recognized members under state incorporation laws.
Membership
168
is not required of nonprofit corporations under the RMNCA.
Therefore, even though member derivative suits exist at law in most
states, they are not presently available as enforcement mechanisms of

*9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994) (denying student standing to challenge the
merger of two private educational institutions despite claims that students would
suffer loss of academic reputation). But cf. Jones v. Grant, 344 So.2d 1210, 1211 (Ala.
1977) (allowing students to proceed with litigation, implicitly recognizing the
“reputation interest” of students and faculty without much discussion).
164. In order to recognize a reputation injury, courts must engage in speculative,
inconclusive, and overly complicated analysis. Cf. In re Barnes Foundation, 684 A.2d
123, 129 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (denying standing of art students who used museum
facilities funded by a charitable trust to challenge a financial settlement agreement
between the trust and one of its donors because students failed to show any actual
harm from the settlement terms, and finding that students actually would benefit in
multiple ways).
165. Since Jones, no court has recognized student standing to challenge university
administrative decisions. Blasko ET AL., supra note 18, at 72-73.
166. See, e.g., Assoc. Students of Univ. of Or. v. Or. Inv. Council, 728 P.2d 30, 31-33
(Or. Ct. App. 1986) (denying standing to students challenging the investment of
higher education funds in South African apartheid corporations as students’ political
opposition to apartheid was not sufficiently distinct from the interests of other
Oregon residents).
167. Cf. O’Donnell v. Sardegna, 646 A.2d 398, 410 (Md. 1994) (denying health
insurance plan subscribers standing to bring a member derivative claim against a
nonprofit insurance company because they were not members as required under
Maryland corporation law); Chambrella v. Rutledge, 740 P.2d 1008, 1016-17 (Haw.
1987) (denying standing to individuals who contributed to a nonprofit project
because they were not formal members); Basich v. Bd. of Pensions of the Evangelical
Lutheran Church in Am., 493 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
plaintiffs could not be considered “members” of the pension board because that
nonprofit entity had not recognized members in its articles of incorporation).
168. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 2.02(a)(5) (1987) (providing that
incorporators under the act may choose “whether or not the corporation will have
members”).
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nonprofits that lack a designated member class, such as private
169
universities.
III. RECOGNIZING UNIVERSITY STUDENT DERIVATIVE RIGHTS
The RMNCA and other state nonprofit reforms make clear that
expanded private party action is the preferred supplement to
170
Yet, despite codification
attorney general charitable enforcement.
of the member derivative suit, the structural flexibility allowed under
171
the RMNCA limits the utility of this supplemental enforcement. In
particular, the RMNCA member derivate provisions have failed to
supplement enforcement where organizations function as member
172
nonprofits, but do not recognize individual members.
Private
universities are good examples of these member-focused nonprofits
173
organized technically as nonmember organizations.
Universities
are primarily committed to educating tuition-paying, enrolled
174
students, but are controlled by self-perpetuating boards of trustees
175
This nonmember
and do not offer students voting membership.
169. See Moody, supra note 48, at 270, n.106 (“If a person . . . does not have the
right to vote for directors, that person is not a member [under the RMNCA].”); see
also Dimieri & Weiner, supra note 113, at 1037 (characterizing the lack of an effective
member-shareholder body as an “unfortunate situation” that commonly occurs in
nonprofit corporations, and that leads to lax accountability standards for nonprofit
directors).
170. Blasko ET AL., supra note 18, at 39-40 (explaining the need for private party
actions despite the resulting inconsistency of enforcement outcomes). The trend
toward explicit recognition of member derivative suits under state nonprofit
corporation laws also infers the modern preference for private party supplemental
charitable enforcement. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.30 (codifying
members’ rights to bring derivative suits against the nonprofit corporation).
171. See Dimieri & Weiner, supra note 113, at 1037 (explaining the reduced
accountability that results from the common situation where nonprofit corporations
have no effective member-shareholder body); O’Donnell, 646 A.2d at 405 (strictly
construing the definition of nonprofit “member” under the Maryland nonprofit
corporation provisions, and disallowing a derivative suit by subscribers to health
insurance plans).
172. See, e.g., O’Donnell, 646 A.2d at 405 (strictly construing the definition of
nonprofit “member” under the Maryland nonprofit corporation provisions, and
denying standing to nonprofit health insurance plan subscribers because they were
not technically members).
173. See supra Part II.A (discussing the structure, purposes, and legal charitable
form of private universities as nonprofit corporations, but detailing the memberoriented educational service that they provide).
174. See Hansmann, supra note 4, at 503-04 (admitting that universities generally
have self-perpetuating boards, but nevertheless are difficult to classify as nonmember
nonprofits).
175. Students may receive rights to vote in student government elections, but they
do not meet the requirements of the voting member under the RMNCA because
they normally do not control the selection of university trustees. See Morton A. Rauh,
The College Trustee-Past, Present, and Future, 40 J. HIGHER ED. 430, 440-41 (1969)
(noting that students are not typically involved in university trustee selection in any
way); REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 1.40(21) (defining “member” for
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structure bars students from bringing derivative actions under the
RMNCA and other state nonprofit corporation laws and limits the
opportunities for private party enforcement in the private university
176
setting.
Despite this lack of membership derivative rights and the
177
longstanding denial of student special interest standing, students
may not be completely out of options for enforcing university trustee
and administrator fiduciary duties. Based on their similarities to
178
nonprofit members, the need for further enforcement in the
179
university setting, and the modern trend embracing member
180
derivative suits, students may be able to articulate a specific
exception for asserting their derivative rights in the university. Under
181
the reasoning of Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School,
which impliedly establishes precedent for recognizing nonprofit
182
courts can examine the
derivative actions by nonmembers,
purposes of the Act as those persons entitled to vote for the election of directors of
the corporation).
176. Cf. O’Donnell, 646 A.2d at 410 (“We are not persuaded that standing to sue
derivatively officers and directors of a nonprofit corporation should be extended to
nonmembers, based on their status as contributors to the corporation or as users or
buyers of its goods or services.”); see also infra Part II.C.2 (explaining that students are
barred from bringing member derivative suits under the RMNCA due to their lack of
technical nonprofit membership status).
177. See, e.g., Miller v. Alderhold, 184 S.E.2d 172, 175 (Ga. 1971) (denying college
students standing and finding “inconceivable” a holding granting student special
interest standing); see also Blasko ET AL., supra note 18, at 72-73 (describing how
student special interest standing has been broadly denied by courts, particularly in
university cases).
178. See infra Part III.C.2 (outlining the similarities between private university
students and nonprofit members).
179. See supra Part II.C (describing the general opinion of attorney general
nonprofit and charitable enforcement as ineffective). This ineffectiveness applies
equally in the university setting and is well demonstrated in the recurring scandals
involving university presidents and trustees. See infra Introduction & notes 7-15
(detailing allegations of abuse by former university presidents Ladner,
Diamondopoulos, and others).
180. The RMNCA, published in 1987, explicitly codified members’ rights to
pursue derivative suits into a nonprofit corporation code. See REVISED MODEL
NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.30 (creating a right of derivative action by members of a
corporation under certain circumstances).
This inclusion was a direct
acknowledgment of the need for supplemental private nonprofit enforcement and
recognition of the development of the common law in several states, which had
already judicially recognized the rights of members to institute derivative actions. See
Moody, supra note 48, at 254-55, 274 (discussing the evolution of the RMNCA and
the intended supervisory effect of member derivative actions on corporate
management).
181. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries
(Stern I), 367 F. Supp. 536 (D.D.C. 1973); Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training
Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries (Stern II), 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
For purposes of this Article, the term “Stern” refers to the Stern I and Stern II cases
collectively.
182. Stern did not specifically or directly answer whether nonmembers of the
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functional reality of the private university and allow students to bring
183
Stern allows
derivative actions against university administrators.
courts to look beyond technical nonprofit membership as a
184
prerequisite to derivative standing
and permit interested
nonmembers to bring derivative actions against nonprofit
185
corporations in order to fill gaps in charitable enforcement.
A. Stern Recognizes Nonmember Standing To Bring Derivative Suits
Against Nonprofit Corporations
In Stern, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
certified a class of former patients to sue the directors of Sibley
Hospital, a nonprofit corporation, for breach of their fiduciary duties
186
in allegedly mismanaging hospital funds.
These patients were
neither recognized members nor donors of the hospital; they were
187
merely former consumers of the hospital’s services.
In the first of
two decisions (Stern I), the district court granted standing to the
patients based on their special interest in the hospital, but limited the
188
available relief to the hospital only.
In Stern II, the same court
imposed fiduciary liability on the nonprofit hospital directors under
corporate—not trust—standards, but did not revisit the issue of
189
standing under corporate principles.
Although the Stern court did not explicitly hold that nonmembers
were entitled to bring a derivative suit on behalf of a nonprofit
190
191
corporation, this was the exact effect of the court’s ruling. Other
nonprofit hospital had standing to bring a derivative action against the hospital.
Instead, the district court decided issues of standing on charitable trust enforcement
principles and did not find it necessary to revisit its holding on standing when
corporate principles were later applied in the case. See Stern I, 367 F. Supp. at 540
(concluding without explanation that former patients held a sufficient interest in the
enforcement of the hospital’s charitable mission to merit special interest standing
under trust principles); see also O’Donnell v. Sardegna, 646 A.2d 398, 408 (Md. 1994)
(noting Stern’s use of trust principles to decide whether patients had standing).
183. See Stern I, 367 F. Supp. at 540 (enabling interested nonmembers to bring
derivative suits against a charitable organization).
184. See id. (determining that former hospital patients had standing to enforce the
fiduciary duties of hospital directors).
185. See O’Donnell, 646 A.2d at 407 (citing Stern as the sole precedent supporting
nonmembers’ standing to enforce the fiduciary duties of nonprofit directors).
186. Stern I, 367 F. Supp. at 540; see also Stern II, 381 F. Supp. at 1007 (identifying
the contentions of former patients who questioned the financial management of the
nonprofit hospital and alleged that hospital directors had engaged in self-dealing
transactions resulting in the hospital’s lost income).
187. See O’Donnell, 646 A.2d at 410 (referring to the Stern patients as “users or
buyers of [the hospital’s] goods or services”).
188. Stern I, 367 F. Supp. at 540; see O’Donnell, 646 A.2d at 407-08 (confirming the
derivative remedy allowed in Stern).
189. Stern II, 381 F. Supp. at 1013.
190. See Stern I, 367 F. Supp. at 540 (allowing nonmember patients to proceed with

160

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1

courts have noted that Stern’s significance for analyzing nonmember
standing in nonprofit derivative actions is that “after the court shifted its
duty analysis from the trust model to the corporation model, it never
192
reconsidered whether the patients had standing to sue.”
By refusing to
reconsider the issue of standing in the case, Stern allowed
193
nonmembers to pursue a derivative cause of action against the
nonprofit hospital despite their lack of official or technical
194
membership in the organization.
The Stern court considered four factors in allowing nonmember
plaintiffs to proceed with a derivative suit against the nonprofit
195
hospital.
These four factors are: (1) the presence of a self196
perpetuating board; (2) an absence of public regulation of the
197
nonprofit organization; (3) a lack of obligation to disclose the

derivative-type claims against nonprofit directors).
191. See O’Donnell, 646 A.2d at 408 (admitting that the effect of Stern was to allow
nonmember standing in a nonprofit derivative suit, but questioning the applicability
of that holding to the case before the court); Newman v. Forward Lands, Inc., 420 F.
Supp. 1320, 1322 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (noting that Stern’s effect was to allow patients to
bring an action very similar to a shareholder derivative suit).
192. O’Donnell, 646 A.2d at 408 (emphasis added).
193. The former patients’ claims against the hospital in Stern were derivative for
two reasons. First, the patients were enforcing duties of the hospital directors that
ran to the corporation, not the patients themselves. Christiansen v. Nat’l Sav. &
Trust Co., 683 F.2d 520, 528 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Second, the court allowed relief for
the hospital only—not the patient-plaintiffs—which mirrors the relief available in a
corporate derivative suit. Id. See generally FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 329
(discussing the process of certification of the Stern patient class to bring the hospital’s
claims of fiduciary breaches).
194. In the end, former patients were allowed to litigate alleged breaches of
fiduciary duties owed to the hospital and permitted to gain injunctive relief for the
nonprofit corporation, not the individual litigants. See Christiansen, 683 F.2d at 528;
see also FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 329 (commenting that the court in Stern
allowed the plaintiffs to bring the action, but barred them from any personal
recovery of damages).
195. In its decisions, the Stern court did not explain its reasoning in detail, nor
clearly list these four factors. See Stern I, 367 F. Supp. at 540-41 (granting standing to
plaintiff patients to prevent injury to the hospital without elaboration or in-depth
explanation). However, later cases interpreting Stern have clarified the factors
relevant to the court’s logic. See Christiansen, 683 F.2d at 527-28 (reflecting on the
rationale of the Stern court and identifying the factors contributing to standing in
Stern); O’Donnell, 646 A.2d at 408 (examining the meaning of Stern when applying its
factors to the facts).
196. Stern II, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also Christiansen, 683
F.2d at 528-29 (“[Stern] points out that the hospital is not closely regulated by any
public authority, it has no responsibility to file financial reports, and its Board is selfperpetuating.”) (internal quotations omitted); O’Donnell, 646 A.2d at 410 (“In
addition to a self-perpetuating board, the court in Stern II considered relevant that
the hospital was not closely regulated by any public authority and it had no
responsibility to file financial reports.”) (internal quotations and alterations
omitted).
197. Stern II, 381 F. Supp. at 1019; Christiansen, 683 F.2d at 529; O’Donnell, 646 A.2d
at 410.
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198

nonprofit’s financial information; and (4) the presence of a private
199
party with a sufficient special interest in the nonprofit corporation.
Other courts interpreting and explaining Stern have noted that the
most important of these factors is the effective lack of public
200
regulation; someone needs to monitor the charity’s function, and
where state regulatory functions are lacking or nonexistent, private
201
parties have a better claim to standing in enforcement actions.
Stern also makes clear that nonmember standing will not be granted
in the absence of a private plaintiff who is sufficiently interested in
202
the nonprofit.
Stern did not explicitly discuss the nature of that
special interest, nor spell out what type of interest would be sufficient
203
for standing purposes. However, Stern’s outcome suggests that the
“sufficient special interest” prong is satisfied where nonmembers are
204
merely consumers of the nonprofit’s services.
Admittedly, Stern is an outlying and somewhat rare case. Thus, its
reasoning should be carefully considered before courts fully embrace
it as precedent for allowing private party enforcement in the
205
charitable sector.
Both the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and the
Court of Appeals of Maryland have questioned Stern’s rationale and

198. Stern II, 381 F. Supp. at 1019; Christiansen, 683 F.2d at 529; O’Donnell, 646 A.2d
at 410.
199. Stern I, 367 F. Supp. at 540 (finding that, because the plaintiffs had “a
sufficient special interest to challenge the conduct of the trustees operating th[e]
charitable institution on a theory of breach of trust,” they could “unquestionably”
proceed with their claims); see Christiansen, 683 F.2d at 528-29 (clarifying that “the
Stern court allowed the patients to maintain their action . . . because if they could not
challenge the directors’ breaches of their duties, no one could”); cf. O’Donnell, 646
A.2d at 410 (finding an insufficient special interest to grant standing to
nonmembers).
200. See Christiansen, 683 F.2d at 527-28 (emphasizing that the patients were the
only ones in position to challenge the directors’ breach of fiduciary duty); O’Donnell,
646 A.2d at 409 (explaining that, in the corporate context, private party derivative
standing is a necessary constraint on the actions of officers and directors).
201. See O’Donnell, 646 A.2d at 410-11 (denying private party standing because the
available public regulation of the health insurance provider included the insurance
commissioner, tax assessors, and the attorney general, who were armed with recent
enactments of stricter regulatory laws regarding the health insurance industry).
202. See Stern I, 367 F. Supp. at 540 (finding that former patients of Sibley Hospital
did have a sufficiently special interest in enforcing hospital directors’ fiduciary duties
to manage hospital funds appropriately).
203. See id. (concluding, without explanation, that patients had a sufficient
interest in the financial management of the hospital).
204. See O’Donnell, 646 A.2d at 410 (acknowledging that Stern recognized a
sufficient special interest in nonprofit enforcement where nonmember parties were
“contributors, . . . [and] users or buyers of . . . goods or services”).
205. See Christiansen, 683 F.2d at 527 (noting that Stern was “novel precedent . . .
representing the outer limits” of nonprofit director liability) (citations omitted);
O’Donnell, 646 A.2d at 410 (labeling Stern’s holding as the “apogee” of relevant case
law and a factual extreme).

162

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1
206

result, yet neither has explicitly disavowed Stern’s central holding.
Yet even in Christiansen v. National Savings & Trust Company and
O’Donnell v. Sartegna, the courts did not find Stern’s outcome or
reasoning incorrect; they simply refused to apply Stern by
207
distinguishing the facts of their cases.
In Christiansen, federal employee health insurance plan subscribers
brought claims of maladministration against the insurance
208
provider. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which had the power
209
Instead, the court of
to overturn Stern’s holding, did not do so.
210
appeals considered and further explained Stern’s reasoning.
According to Christiansen, the Stern decision was premised mainly on
the fact that enforcement of the hospital directors’ fiduciary duties
was left solely to the patients; no one else existed to hold the
211
nonprofit directors accountable.
The Christiansen court then
distinguished its facts from Stern, noting that a more closely related
and directly injured party existed to litigate the alleged malfeasance
212
in the case of the insurance provider.
213
Similarly, the O’Donnell court questioned Stern and distinguished
the case on factual grounds without discounting Stern’s legal
214
reasoning. In O’Donnell, the Maryland Court of Appeals refused to
apply Stern to allow nonmember healthcare plan subscribers to bring
215
derivative claims against plan administrators.
Although the
206. See Christiansen, 683 F.2d at 528-29 (narrowly interpreting Stern as providing
no authority for the proposition that nonprofit corporations owe fiduciary duties
directly to nonmembers); O’Donnell, 646 A.2d at 410 (distinguishing the “selfperpetuating board” and the absence of regulation in Stern from the facts in
O’Donnell); FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 330 (noting the importance of
Christiansen as a critique and explanation of Stern, not an outright invalidation of its
holding).
207. See Christiansen, 683 F.2d at 529 (distinguishing its facts Stern by noting that
“Stern does not support the proposition that nonprofit corporate entities owe a
fiduciary duty to plaintiffs as subscribers”); FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at 329-30
(explaining the Christiansen court’s refusal to apply Stern because the plaintiffs there
used Stern only to establish that the nonprofit healthcare insurer owed fiduciary
duties directly to the subscribers). Similarly, the O’Donnell court questioned the Stern
rationale, but ultimately distinguished Stern on factual grounds. O’Donnell, 646 A.2d
at 410.
208. Christiansen, 683 F.2d at 521.
209. Id. at 529.
210. See id. at 527-28 (considering, in-depth, the impact of Stern’s reasoning to the
instant case).
211. Id. at 528.
212. Id. at 528-29.
213. O’Donnell v. Sardegna, 646 A.2d 398, 408-09 (Md. 1994).
214. See id. at 410 (indicating that the self-perpetuating nature of the board in
Stern and the absence of close public regulation or financial filing responsibility in
that case sufficiently distinguished Stern from O’Donnell to justify a denial of
standing).
215. Id.
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plaintiffs in both the Stern and the O’Donnell cases were consumers of
216
nonprofit services, the O’Donnell court distinguished the cases
because the levels of official regulation imposed on the nonprofit
217
defendants were substantially different.
Unlike Stern’s Sibley
Hospital, the nonprofit healthcare provider under attack in O’Donnell
was under “considerable statutory and administrative regulation,” and
thus, other enforcement mechanisms existed to monitor any
218
maladministration.
Since other regulation and effective
enforcement of the plan administrators’ fiduciary duties existed,
there was no need to stretch nonprofit corporate law to allow this
219
private party litigation.
Importantly for student derivative actions, O’Donnell does not
preclude nonmember standing in all nonprofit derivative cases.
There the court found only that a mere consumer or contributor
220
relationship was not an adequate basis for allowing derivative suits.
Since the relationship between students and universities is more
substantial than that between consumers and service providers,
students have a stronger argument for nonmember derivative
221
standing than the plaintiffs in Stern, Christiansen, and O’Donnell.

216. See id. at 402-03 (describing plaintiffs as “essentially . . . customers, because
(1) they have no equity interest in [the corporation’s] long term success, and (2)
lacking any voting power, they have no say in corporate governance”).
217. See id. at 410-11 (discussing at length the numerous agencies that directly
monitor the healthcare plan provider, including the Maryland Commissioner of
Insurance, the Department of Assessments and Taxation, and the Attorney General);
cf. Christiansen v. Nat’l Sav. & Trust Co., 683 F.2d 520, 528-29 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(pointing out Stern’s reliance on the lack of other public regulation to grant
standing).
218. O’Donnell, 646 A.2d at 410.
219. Id. at 411. The O’Donnell court also refused to recognize standing for plan
subscribers because doing so would require “a very expansive construction” of
Maryland’s corporation statutes and create the potential for vexatious suits. Id. The
Maryland Nonprofit Corporation law, however, is not modeled after the RMNCA.
FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 3, at app. tbl.3. Therefore, O’Donnell’s interpretation of
the extent of the member derivative suit is not necessarily controlling in those
jurisdictions that have adopted the RMNCA. In fact, while prevention of frivolous
nonprofit litigation is a legitimate policy goal, the RMNCA member derivative suit
provisions suggest an expansion, not contraction, of private party enforcement in
appropriate cases. See Moody, supra note 48, at 271 (“More than any other part of
the [RMNCA], the provisions with respect to membership are enabling.”).
220. See O’Donnell, 646 A.2d at 410 (“We are not persuaded that standing to sue
derivatively officers and directors of a nonprofit corporation should be extended to
nonmembers, based on their status as contributors to the corporation or as users or
buyers of its goods or services.”).
221. See infra Part III.B (applying Stern’s reasoning to the case of university
students seeking to assert derivative rights in the university).
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B. University Students Have a Strong Case for Derivative Standing Under
Stern
The central holding of Stern, which allowed nonmembers to bring
a derivative action against a nonprofit corporation, has not been
222
overturned. As applied in the context of university students, Stern’s
outcome provides a new opportunity for students to demand the
accountability of those who control their educational investments.
University students seeking to enforce the fiduciary duties of college
presidents and trustees satisfy each of the four factors under the Stern
test and, in fact, present a more compelling and less extreme claim to
223
nonmember derivative standing than the Stern patients.
University students meet the first Stern factor because private
224
university boards are typically self-perpetuating.
Just as the Sibley
Hospital board in Stern was self-selecting, university boards of trustees
are held to lesser checks on accountability because they are not
225
subject to popular election.
Since they lack internal democratic
checks on trustee conduct, self-perpetuating college boards are more
susceptible to fiduciary breach, and according to Stern’s reasoning,
226
present a greater need for private party enforcement.
Likewise, private university students meet Stern’s second factor
because the operation of private universities and the fiduciary duties
227
of school leaders are not closely regulated by any public authority.
Attorneys general do have charitable enforcement authority over
228
229
universities,
but recurring college scandals
and critiques of
222. See supra Part III.A (discussing subsequent judicial interpretation and critique
of the Stern holding).
223. See supra Part III.A (outlining the four Stern factors and discussing courts’
interpretations of Stern as applied to standing of nonmembers).
224. The self-perpetuating nature of nonprofit, private university trusteeship is a
“time-honored concept,” despite suggestions for expanding control of the university
board. See Rauh, supra note 175, at 440-41 (noting the prevalence of the selfperpetuating university board of trustees, and urging the empowerment of other
university constituencies, like students and faculty, to participate in university
governance); see also LOMBARDI ET AL., supra note 129, at 5-7 (explaining the
widespread use of a self-perpetuating university board of trustees).
225. Cf. Dimieri & Weiner, supra note 113, at 1047-48 (discussing the importance
of a third nonprofit membership group in the corporate design for balancing the
power structure and ensuring accountability and proper conduct by nonprofit
managers and directors).
226. Cf. id. (discussing the increased chance of misconduct or self-dealing where a
self-perpetuating board is used); Stern II, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(listing the presence of a self-perpetuating board as one factor justifying private party
enforcement of nonprofit fiduciary duties).
227. See supra Part III.A (listing the lack of public oversight as a main concern of
the Stern and O’Donnell courts).
228. See Blasko ET AL., supra note 18, at 41 (explaining that attorneys general have
a “preclusive power of enforcement” in university student and other charitable
enforcement cases, which as a general rule disallows private enforcement).
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charitable enforcement indicate that the adequacy of this oversight is
230
doubtful. Thus, although universities are technically regulated by a
public official, this regulation is in name only, and does not provide
231
meaningful enforcement of the administrators’ fiduciary duties.
Importantly, the same attorney general enforcement applied to the
Sibley Hospital in Stern, yet the court still held that private party
232
enforcement was appropriate under the circumstances. Moreover,
unlike the healthcare nonprofit corporations in O’Donnell and
Christiansen, which are heavily regulated at the state level, private
universities enjoy a relative freedom from state or federal oversight
233
into their operations.
University students also meet the third Stern factor because, much
like Sibley Hospital, private universities are not required to file
234
financial reports with any public agency. Again, the assumption is
that less disclosure increases the need for effective external
enforcement mechanisms such as private party derivative suits.
Finally, the argument for university students’ nonmember derivate
standing is strongest under Stern’s fourth requirement that students
235
hold a sufficiently special interest in the university.
Under Stern,
students qualify for nonmember derivative standing against the
university because their interest in university administrator fiduciary
229. See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text (discussing the presidential
scandals at American and Adelphi Universities).
230. See supra Part I.C.1 (summarizing scholarly assessment of the failure of
attorney general charitable enforcement).
231. See Stern II, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1019 (D.D.C. 1974) (implicitly denying that
attorney general enforcement is adequate public oversight by stating that the
nonprofit hospital, under the enforcement authority of the attorney general, was
“not closely regulated”); see also O’Donnell v. Sardegna, 646 A.2d 398, 410-11 (Md.
1994) (finding public oversight was adequate where enforcement was carried out by
multiple agencies in addition to the attorney general).
232. See generally Stern I, 367 F. Supp. 536 (D.D.C. 1973) (allowing interested
private parties to proceed with an enforcement action against the nonprofit hospital,
despite the attorney general’s enforcement role).
233. Cf. O’Donnell, 646 A.2d at 410-11 (listing a number of state agencies that have
the power to investigate, oversee, and ensure the proper operations of the health
insurance plan provider).
234. There is currently no widespread system of nonprofit financial oversight
besides reporting to the IRS for tax exemption. Cf. Reiser, There Ought to Be a Law,
supra note 3, at 562-68 (discussing the recent movement to experiment with
nonprofit financial disclosure requirements at the state level, reflecting the past
system of non-disclosure). However, Sibley Hospital was under the same obligation
to make IRS filings as private universities, and the Stern court did not consider this
reporting adequate financial disclosure. See Stern II, 381 F. Supp. at 1019.
235. See Stern I, 367 F. Supp. at 538-40 (finding that Sibley Hospital patients held a
sufficiently special interest as former customers of nonprofit hospital services, despite
the fact that their losses resulting from hospital mismanagement were indirect and
remote); see also supra Part III.A (examining Stern’s “special interest” finding in
relation to the former patients).
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enforcement is more substantial than that held by the Stern,
236
Christiansen, or O’Donnell plaintiffs.
Stern found that former patients of Sibley Hospital, as mere
purchasers of nonprofit services, held a sufficient special interest in
enforcing the proper management of the hospital’s charitable
237
assets.
Stern’s weakness was that it failed to explain or support its
conclusion that these former consumers held a sufficiently special
238
interest in the hospital’s function.
Yet this factual weakness is
greatly lessened in the case of university students. Logically, if former
patients—mere consumers—held a derivative interest in the hospital,
then other nonprofit participants with relationships more closely
resembling membership should also be able to assert derivative
claims against nonprofit corporations. Private universities operate in
reality much like member nonprofit corporations despite their
239
technical lack of members, and students play a role within the
240
university very similar to that of nonprofit members. Since students
are more analogous to recognized members than nonprofit
consumers, students’ interests in nonmember derivative standing not
only meet, but surpass, the fourth Stern factor.
1. Private universities function as member nonprofit corporations despite
their nonmember legal structure
Several scholars suggest that effective enforcement of any
particular charitable institution requires a response tailored
241
Specifically, they
specifically to the purposes it serves in society.
argue for enforcement schemes that distinguish between member236. Plaintiffs in each of these cases were consumers or former consumers. See
Christiansen v. Nat’l Sav. & Trust Co., 683 F.2d 520, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (examining
a claim by plaintiffs who were healthcare insurance plan subscribers); Stern I, 367 F.
Supp. at 536 (involving plaintiffs who were former hospital patients); O’Donnell, 646
A.2d at 399 (describing plaintiffs who were healthcare insurance plan subscribers).
237. See Stern I, 367 F. Supp. at 538, 540 (describing the former patients’ interests
in antitrust claims as too remote and indirect, then concluding abruptly that
“[p]laintiffs unquestionably” had a sufficient special interest in the enforcement of
hospital director fiduciary duties).
238. See Christiansen, 683 F.2d at 527 (explaining that the Stern special interest
holding contained less analysis than that of plaintiffs’ antitrust standing).
239. See infra Part III.B.1 (describing the functional reality of private universities as
corporations which primarily serve enrolled students).
240. See infra Part III.B.2 (comparing the roles, rights, and expectations of
university students and nonprofit members).
241. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 117, at 660 (“[C]harities are not the whole of
the nonprofit sector. Even within that sector, important differences between
organizations may necessitate different criteria for standing to sue the organizations’
fiduciaries.”); Fishman, supra note 33, at 683 (“[A]ttention must be given to the
realities of nonprofit corporation governance and the development of alternative
approaches to the effective monitoring of nonprofits’ performance.”).
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oriented organizations and “traditional,” donor-dependent
242
charities. They argue that private party standing to bring derivative
243
actions should depend on the corporation’s primary purpose and
244
the sources of its income, not upon the optional recognition of
245
Under this rationale,
members in its organizational documents.
private universities should be treated as member nonprofit
corporations for enforcement purposes, despite their technical
nonmember status, due to their student-centered educational
246
purposes and tuition-based funding.
Private universities serve the general public by supplementing
public education, research, academic exploration, and the
advancement of general social knowledge. However, the primary
purpose of a private university is to educate currently-enrolled
247
students who have paid tuition.
In addition, universities derive a

242. Hansmann’s typology, which divides nonprofit corporations into donative,
commercial, mutual, and entrepreneurial organizations, demonstrates that some
nonprofit charities do not fill the traditional role of meeting social welfare needs. See
Hansmann, supra note 4, at 502-04 (analyzing the essential features and appropriate
role of nonprofit organizations). Instead, he argues that some nonprofits are
organized specifically to meet “contract failures” where the market economy does
not provide products or services to the full satisfaction of consumers. Id. at 506-07.
According to Avner Ben-Ner, the purposes and operation of many charities are not
actually charitable because they do not provide support services to the needy
populations. See Ben-Ner, supra, note 42, at 732-34 (reviewing the proposition that
nonprofit organizations often participate in activities that are unrelated to their
charitable missions and that executives of nonprofits misuse the organizations’
resources). He suggests, therefore, that the true beneficiaries and those most
interested in enforcement are determined by examining the source of the
organization’s funding. Id.; see also Atkinson, supra note 117, at 660 (“[D]ifferences
between charitable organizations and mutual benefit organizations are particularly
important [for enforcement purposes].”).
243. Cf. Hansmann, supra note 4, at 553-60 (discussing the purposes, roles, and
different problems that arise in the context of member-oriented nonprofit
corporations); Atkinson, supra note 117, at 660 (cautioning that within the nonprofit
sector, there are important differences between organizations that may require
different criteria for standing).
244. Cf. Ben-Ner, supra note 42, at 735 (“[T]hose who have an economic demand
for the nonprofit form [those actually receiving benefits from the nonprofit
corporation] are in the best position to ensure [effective nonprofit operation].”);
Hansmann, supra note 4, at 502-03 (positing that the private parties who fund
member-oriented nonprofit corporations, what he calls “patrons,” should have
standing to bring derivative actions to increase the effectiveness of nonprofit
enforcement).
245. Compare Ben-Ner, supra note 42, at 735 (arguing that private enforcement by
interested consumers of nonprofit services creates an economic demand that best
ensures accountability) with REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.30 (1987)
(proposing derivative litigation rights for recognized members only, regardless of the
economic demand for such enforcement).
246. See supra Part II.A (discussing the legal forms of private universities as
nonmember nonprofits).
247. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing students’ interest in the continued success of
the organization).
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large percentage of their operating income from student tuition and
248
fees. Universities may utilize alumni and other donations, but the
sheer percentage of operating income derived from tuition makes it
clear that universities depend mainly on student payments for
249
funding. Together these two factors show that private universities,
despite their technical legal classification as nonmember nonprofit
corporations, fit more accurately under the label of membership
250
nonprofits.
2.

University students are more analogous to nonprofit members
Assuming that private universities operate as member nonprofits,
students are the most natural constituents to serve as members of the
corporate university. Students and nonprofit members share similar
expectations, roles, obligations, rights, privileges, and interests in
251
These shared characteristics make
their respective organizations.
the student-university relationship much more analogous to
252
membership than the patient-hospital relationship in Stern.
Therefore, courts should recognize students’ sufficient special
interest in private universities and grant them nonmember derivative
standing to supplement attorney general enforcement.
Nonprofit members and students share similar expectations, goals,
and motivations for associating with their respective organizations.
Like members who join nonprofit organizations to meet a particular
253
need unmet in the marketplace, students attend private universities
to obtain an education that they believe is not available in public

248. In 2001-2002, student tuition and fees accounted for approximately forty
percent total income for private degree-granting institutions. EDUCATION STATISTICS,
supra note 19.
249. Cf. id. (listing the amount of private university income received from all
funding sources and showing that student tuition provides the largest source of
private university funding comparatively).
250. Recognition of private universities as membership nonprofits does not upset
the system of nonprofit classification under the RMNCA. While educational
institutions typically incorporate as public benefit organizations, see Reiser,
Dismembering Civil Society, supra note 114, at 839, these public benefit corporations still
have the option to create a class of members. Cf. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP.
ACT §§ 1.40(28), 17.07(3) (1987) (defining and setting forth requirements of
establishing a public benefit corporation).
251. See infra Part III.B.2 (positing that students actively contribute to the
university community by attending classes and participating in campus activities).
252. See Stern I, 367 F. Supp. 536, 536-37 (D.D.C. 1973) (plaintiffs are former
patients, of the Sibley Hospital with no other ties to the nonprofit organization); cf.
O’Donnell v. Sardegna, 646 A.2d 398, 410 (Md. 1994) (categorizing the Stern patients
as mere purchasers of hospital services).
253. See Hansmann, supra note 4, at 506-07 (explaining that most memberoriented nonprofit corporations organize to meet the needs of consumers who are
dissatisfied with the products or services that the market offers).
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254

institutions.
Both groups join because it will serve their particular
255
Furthermore, since members and students are both
needs.
dependent on these nonprofits for important services, they are both
interested in the organizations’ continued success as they receive
256
secondary benefits from such success.
Characterizations of the legal relationships and obligations
between nonprofit and member and university and student are also
strikingly similar. Just as nonprofit members’ and shareholders’
257
relationships to their corporate organizations, courts have often
258
described the university-student relationship as a contractual one.
Both groups gain membership or admittance only after meeting the
restrictive admission requirements set by the organizations
259
themselves.
In addition, most members pay initial and periodic
nonprofit membership fees, while students pay tuition and student
fees in order to enroll. Further, neither the obligations and
privileges arising from membership nor student enrollment are freely
transferable at the option of the member or student; nonprofit
260
membership, like student attendance, is unique and personal.
254. Cf. id. (observing that complex personal services like education often cannot
be adequately evaluated by purchasers, and therefore, students may prefer the
nonprofit (private) provision of educational services to account for this market
“contract failure”).
255. Cf. Ben-Ner, supra note 42, at 734 (identifying consumer dissatisfaction with
market-provided services as the motivation for seeking nonprofit services); Kent
Weeks & Rich Haglund, Fiduciary Duties Of College And University Faculty And
Administrators, 29 J.C. & U.L. 153, 158 (2002) (“Students at universities depend on
the university to help them become educated.”).
256. As the goals of a nonprofit corporation are met with increasing effectiveness,
members gain from the increased value of those products or services. More
specifically in the university context, students gain reputation and career
marketability, which comes with an increasingly popular or well-respected university.
Cf. Steeneck v. Univ. of Bridgeport, No. 93-0133773, 1994 WL 463629, at *4 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994) (discussing how students’ challenges to university
administration demonstrate that students greatly value a school’s reputation, and are
vastly concerned with the reputation loss that could result from a merger with
another school).
257. See, e.g., Brenner v. Powers, 584 N.E.2d 569, 574 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (finding
that a contractual relationship arises between the organization and the member
when nonprofit articles of incorporation recognize members).
258. See generally K.B. Melear, The Contractual Relationship Between Student and
Institution: Disciplinary, Academic, and Consumer Contexts, 30 J.C. & U.L. 175 (2003)
(discussing the modern trend of classifying the university-student relationship as
primarily contractual in nature).
259. Just as qualifications for membership are outlined by nonprofit incorporators
in the articles of incorporation or organization’s bylaws, student qualifications for
admittance (i.e., high school graduation) are firmly established by university
administrators. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 6.01(a), 3.02(15) (1987)
(permitting articles or bylaws to create procedures for admitting members and
establishing a corporation’s general power to set conditions for admission of
members).
260. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.11 (restricting members from

170

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1

Finally, members’ and students’ interests and investments are both
protected by the legal fiduciary obligations that govern nonprofit
261
managers.
Nonprofit members and students also fill similar roles in their
organizations as both groups contribute more time, energy, and
262
money over a longer span of time than donors or volunteers. This
increased participation in the ongoing operation and development of
the nonprofit corporation is an important factor recognized under
263
the RMNCA. Just as members direct nonprofit programs and serve
on nonprofit committees, students also actively contribute to the
university community by attending classes, performing research
assistance, and participating in campus organizations and activities.
A central feature defining nonprofit membership is the enjoyment
264
of privileges and rights that are not available to the general public.
Students, like members, gain special rights and privileges upon
admittance to the university. For example, upon enrollment,
students gain the right to attend classes and earn a degree, privileges
to use university facilities like campus sports centers or computer
labs, access to career and other counseling, rights to be represented
in student government, and the ability to participate in student
265
organizations.
transferring any interests in the nonprofit unless the corporation itself allows such
transfer). Likewise, students cannot transfer their right to attend a university to
another potential student at their option. Each student must be admitted on
separate consideration by university admissions directors.
261. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 (listing fiduciary duties of
nonprofit directors to the corporation); cf. Weeks & Haglund, supra note 255, at 15455, 173 (arguing that university administrators owe a fiduciary duty directly to
students in certain situations including the management of tuition funds).
262. Cf. Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society, supra note 114, at 852 (examining the
more involved role of members as decision-makers or monitors/enforcers, but
noting that volunteers and donors can be admitted as members to an organization).
See generally Dimieri & Weiner, supra note 115 (discussing member involvement
including exerting influence and control over the nonprofit board of directors).
263. Cf. Moody, supra note 48, at 270-71 (discussing the RMNCA’s focus on
member participation as the basis for membership rights, which signals a shift away
from the classic shareholder equity ownership model).
264. Nonprofit membership can include special privileges such as member
discounts, access to organizational information, opportunities to participate
personally in the operations of the organization through service on organizational
committees or boards, and voting rights to control the mission and goals of the
organization. See Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society, supra note 114, at 273. The most
important of these rights under the RMNCA, is of course, voting. See REVISED MODEL
NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 7.20-7.30 (outlining provisions setting forth specific
procedures for member voting, implying the importance of member involvement
and interaction).
265. Cf. Melear, supra note 258 (detailing the various contexts in which students
have sought legal enforcement of educational contract rights, including disciplinary
proceedings and educational program terminations).
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Nonprofit members and students clearly differ in the voting rights
they hold in their organizations. Members, as defined in the
RMNCA, are generally entitled to vote in the election of nonprofit
266
directors and to amend the nonprofit articles of incorporation.
267
Typically, university students do not hold similar rights. Despite the
centrality of voting rights to the nonprofit membership under the
RMNCA, students’ lack of voting rights does not necessarily defeat
students’ analogous role as members in private universities.
Students’ lack of formal control in university policymaking may be
mitigated by other informal mechanisms by which students influence
268
university decision-making.
At some institutions, students can
represent their views through honorary or non-voting seats on the
269
board of trustees, participation in formal student governments, or
public opposition to university policies in student-run newspapers or
270
demonstrations.
Even the inadequacy of these informal control mechanisms as a
replacement for formal voting power may not defeat students’ claims
to nonprofit membership. As Professor Dana Resier explains,
[T]he concept of membership need not be entirely static.
Nonprofit corporate statutes do define the voting rights of
members as a matter of default . . . [but] also permit individual
nonprofits to vary member rights from these default positions.
Nonprofits who take advantage of this flexibility might create
multiple classes of members, some with and some without voting
rights, or might limit the actions on which their members will be
entitled to vote . . . . This permissive structure allows for endless
271
permutations of the member concept . . . .

Thus, nonprofit corporations could imaginably design a
recognized membership that lacks voting rights, yet is still entitled to
272
bring derivative suits in courts of law. University students may be a
perfect example of the RMNCA’s “design flexibility” that Reiser

266. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 1.40(21)
267. See Rauh, supra note 175, at 440-41 (explaining that university boards of
trustees are generally self-perpetuating, and trustee selection does not typically
include the input or approval of students).
268. See D. Bruce Johnstone, The Student And His Power, 40 J. HIGHER EDUC. 205,
206-18 (1969) (contending that informal modes of control like student forums,
student government, individualized academic plans, and protests against
administrators’ decisions allow students to exert relatively large amounts of control
over university policies).
269. Id. at 211-12.
270. Id. at 217-18.
271. Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society, supra note 114, at 840-41.
272. Cf. id. (explaining how the flexibility offered to nonprofit incorporators
allows for many varying membership classes).
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273

discusses.
According to Reiser, knowledgeable nonprofit
incorporators could create a student membership closely tailored to
allow involvement, investment of time, money, and personal
commitment, retention of a continuing interest in the school, and a
274
complete lack of voting rights.
According to this detailed analogy between students and nonprofit
members, although students’ interests in the university are not
technically recognized as nonprofit memberships, they clearly surpass
275
the consumer interest of the Stern patients. University students thus
meet all four of the Stern factors and, under that precedent, qualify
for nonmember standing to bring derivative claims against the
276
universities they attend.
C. Other Policy Considerations Support Recognizing Student Derivative
Suits
In addition to the legal and factual arguments presented above,
several policy considerations also support the recognition of a
university student derivative suit. The following arguments are not
intended to stand alone to justify students’ legal right to bring
derivative actions against their universities. However, these policy
arguments are an important addition to the debate, and address
many of the general objections that courts and commentators have
voiced against private charitable enforcement.
1. Derivative litigation accommodates students’ lack of extra-judicial
methods for protecting their interests
Students need access to the member derivative suit because their
interests and investments in the university are not otherwise
277
In addition to derivative
protected in any meaningful way.
273. See id. at 841 (noting that flexibility may allow for the creation of multiple
classes of members).
274. See id. at 840-41 (commenting on the endless possibilities of corporate
structure and membership available to sophisticated nonprofit incorporators).
275. Unlike the Stern patients, who were mere purchasers of nonprofit hospital
services, students play a more significant role within, and hold a greater interest in,
the university. Cf. Haskell, supra note 6, at 2-3 (noting that universities stand
generally in a higher position of trust with their enrolled students); Weeks &
Haglund, supra note 255, at 158-59 (discussing the increasing trend of courts to
recognize the fiduciary, not merely contractual or consumer, relationship between
the university and the student).
276. Cf. Stern I, 367 F. Supp. 536, 540 (D.D.C. 1973) (allowing former patients of a
nonprofit hospital, mere consumers, to bring derivative claims of fiduciary breaches
on behalf of the nonprofit hospital, despite their nonmember status).
277. Cf. Hansmann, supra note 4, at 613 (opining that nonmember constituencies
may actually be in greater need of legal standing to sue nonprofits because they lack
the other control mechanisms (i.e., voting) that members enjoy).
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litigation, shareholders and nonprofit members can exert control
over directors and trustees through extra-judicial mechanisms such as
278
However, these
voting, selling shares, and market oversight.
mechanisms are either unavailable or ineffective for university
students. First, students do not have any internal democratic method
279
for controlling the direction of the university.
Students are also
280
unable to easily transfer their interest in the university. Finally, the
student population is not as capable of exerting political pressure on
attorneys general to investigate fraud because they are perceived as
politically inactive: many students cannot vote in the state in which
they attend school and typically cannot make significant
contributions to political campaigns. Since none of these
alternatives—voting, transfer, market oversight, or political
mobilization—adequately protect student interests, allowance of a
student derivative suit will empower students to better protect their
substantial educational investments.
2. Recognizing student derivative rights will not open litigation floodgates
against universities
A primary bar against recognizing student derivative rights is the
281
Critics contend that student
longstanding floodgates argument.
derivative suits will expose universities to frivolous litigation,
unpredictable levels of liability, and ultimately divert funds away from
282
education.
Despite the value of this critique, its import to the
278. See Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society, supra note 114, at 837 (noting that
shareholders can exert influence and they are “not merely ticket holders in some
great corporate lottery”).
279. Although students usually enjoy the privilege of voting for student
government representatives, students generally have no voting power or other
method for exerting control over university trustees. Cf. Rauh, supra note 175, at
440-41 (urging a change in the university trustee selection process to include the
votes of students).
280. Shareholders can utilize the liquidity of their financial investment and sell all
interests in a corporation that does not perform to their satisfaction. See Reiser,
Dismembering Civil Society, supra note 114, at 837-38 (differentiating nonprofit
members from for-profit shareholders who have voting rights and rights of exit that
allow them to exert influence on their organizations). Although students can
transfer to different schools, the high costs and uncertainty of transferring do not
offer significant protection of students’ financial and educational investments.
281. Avoiding vexatious litigation is one of the original purposes for placing
charitable enforcement powers exclusively in the attorney general. In theory, the
attorney general will only pursue legitimate claims and therefore preserve charitable
funds for their maximum charitable use. See Fishman, supra note 33, at 670
(rationalizing the attorney general’s role as necessary because property is devoted to
accomplish purposes that are beneficial to the community at large, which is a shifting
class).
282. See, e.g., Russell v. Yale Univ., No. 970400425, 1997 WL 809974, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Dec. 31, 1997) (denying student standing in part to protect universities
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university context may be overstated. Several factors serve as natural
“flood gatekeepers” in the university student setting, and therefore
reduce the risk of overwhelming amounts of university student
litigation.
Some of these limitations arise from the very nature of the student
class and students’ interests in the university. Students generally lack
the financial ability and incentive to pursue private action against
university administrators unless the suit is truly warranted and
283
important to the student body. Also, the limited number of years in
which individuals actually hold student interests acts as a major
284
barrier to student litigation.
The nature of derivative relief also
limits students’ incentives to litigate. Since derivative damages go
directly to the school and students receive no direct personal benefit
285
from the recovery, students are unlikely to invest their own time
and funds into litigating frivolous matters. Students, by this logic, will
only pursue those suits with a high chance of success and remedies
large enough to make a sizable impact on campus.
Other external limitations are also available. Courts can borrow
procedural limitations from shareholder derivative suits to weed out
286
unnecessary student litigation.
For example, the demand
287
288
requirement and the posting of security bonds have effectively
from litigation and limit the power of small interest groups within the university
community to veto necessary administrative decisions).
283. See supra Part III.B.2 (arguing that students have little incentive to litigate
because derivative damages go directly to the school).
284. The number of students who remain enrolled throughout the case, remain
personally interested enough to commence private litigation, and are capable of
financing litigation is very low, and therefore very unlikely to cause a great flood of
private litigation for universities.
285. See Goldschmid, supra note 3, at 652 (arguing that nonprofit corporations
themselves should receive remedies from donor, member, and beneficiary derivative
actions, much like the remedies in shareholder derivative suits).
286. Well-developed procedures from corporate law could easily be translated into
the university setting and would provide even more control over the perceived flood
of litigation against universities. Cf. Boykin, supra note 46, at 1011-12 (discussing the
possible drawback of member “strike suits” and arguing that statutory limitations on
member qualification to bring a suit can be modeled after the corporate derivative
suit requirements to limit vexatious litigation).
287. The universal demand requirement, an initial hurdle for shareholder
derivative claims, is a particularly useful device for curtailing frivolous shareholder
claims and promoting internal democratic or market resolution of corporate
conflict. Under the ALI Principles, before commencing with litigation, shareholder
plaintiffs must demand legal action by the corporation, or else their derivative claim
will be dismissed. See American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance:
Analysis and Recommendations, 2 A.L.I. § 7.03(a) (1994) (focusing on the requirement
of exhaustion of intra-corporate remedies in a derivative action and mandating that a
holder or director make a written demand upon a board of directors, requesting it to
prosecute an action or make a suitable correction). Delaware corporate law also
requires shareholder-litigants to make a demand for action upon the corporation, or
to be excused from making that demand by showing the utter futility of the action.
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minimized frivolous litigation in the business context. Also, under
the RMNCA, students would not be able to initiate a derivative suit
unless they were able to solicit the approval of a certain percentage of
289
fellow members of the student body.
In this way, stringent
procedural rules will ensure that derivative suits are not used lightly
290
or prematurely.
CONCLUSION
The recent allegations against former American University
president Benjamin Ladner vividly demonstrate that attorneys
general have failed to ensure accountability in private universities.
Despite the success of private enforcement in other nonprofit
settings, courts have historically kept this opportunity from students
by denying their standing to raise claims of managerial impropriety
against university administrators. Under the special interest doctrine,
students fail because they are an amorphous, fluctuating class whose
interests and injury arising from mismanagement are indirect.
Students are also barred from bringing nonprofit member derivative
suits by the technical statutory requirement that they be recognized
members under university charters.
Yet under the reasoning of Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National
Training School, private university students have a compelling
argument for their right to bring derivative suits against self-dealing
college administrators. Although not technically members, students
hold interests, roles, relationships, and privileges in the university
setting that are closely analogous to those of nonprofit members. In
addition, the need for supplemental enforcement in the private
university setting is great, and students’ power to hold universities
accountable through other means is practically non-existent. Under
Stern, the student relationship and the obvious lack of public
oversight of private universities supports the conclusion that students,
even more than the Stern patients, are entitled to assert derivative
See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 780 (Del. 1981) (discussing a
stockholder’s argument that demand was futile because all of the directors were
named as defendants and were allegedly involved in the acts specified).
288. See Boykin, supra note 46, at 1011-12 (noting the member security bond as a
possible procedural limitation yet finding that the RMNCA five percent rule
adequately filters nuisance litigation).
289. The RMNCA hinges the right of members to sue derivatively on his or her
ability to muster approval of the suit by five percent of the voting membership or fifty
members, whichever is lower. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.30(a)(1)
(1987).
290. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.30 cmt. 1 (noting that the use of
procedural limitations can effectively prevent “strike suits”).
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claims against the university. Courts therefore should extend the
statutory and common law right of the member derivative suit to
university students.

